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L Introduction
In Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of America,' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court for the
District of South Carolina's cancellation under the federal Lanham Act2 of
an "incontestable" federal registration covering the configuration of the
plaintiff's UGLY STIK line of fishing rods. In so holding, the appellate
* Adjunct Professor, Emory University School of Law. Kilpatrick & Cody, Atlanta,
Georgia. B.A. Davidson College, 1987; J.D. University of Virginia, 1990.
1. 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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court applied the literal language of section 14 of the Act' to limit the
grounds upon which such a cancellation can be effected. The result of this
analysis was the continued maintenance on the Principal Register of the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) of a trade dress consisting of an
apparently wholly functional product configuration.
Tis Article addresses the doctrinal and practical problems associated
with the federal trade dress registration of product configurations under the
Lanham Act. Part II surveys the degree of protection afforded to
unregistered designations of origin under unfair competition law, including
those deemed to be functional. Part I then examines the federal
registration system established by the Act, with a particular focus on the
Act's so-called "incontestability" provisions. Finally, the Article addresses
the Shakespeare litigation itself. Part IV argues that the Fourth Circuit's
opinion in Shakespeare represents not only an incorrect statement of
trademark law, but one that promises to have significant deleterious effects
on the balance between competition and monopoly This Part proposes an
alternative interpretation of the Lanham Act that would encompass
cancellation actions on facts similar to those in Shakespeare, a framework
compatible not only with the underlying purposes of the Act, but with the
Constitution as well.
II. Acquisition of Rights to Unregistered Designations of Origin
A. Trademarks and Service Marks
The Lanham Act, which was intended m most respects to be a
codification of the common law at the time of its passage, recogmzes and
defines several designations that may qualify for protection under its
provisions. A "trademark," for example, may be "any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof" that may be used by its
owner "to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique
product, from those manufactured and sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown."' In contrast, a
"service mark" performs the same functions for its owner's services.5
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1988). For the text of § 14(3), see infra note 131 and
accompanying text.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
5. Id. In addition to trademarks and service marks, the Act also establishes other
categories of marks. A "certification mark," for example, is a mark that certifies such
things as a product's regional origin or mode of manufacture, while "collective marks"
include designations indicating membership in a union, an association, or other organization.
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All trademarks and service marks are not created equal, nor are their
owners automatically entitled to protection against a competitor's use of a
confusingly similar mark.6 First and foremost, neither the Lanham Act nor
the common law affords protection to terms with a primarily generic
meamng, or, in other words, terms "that refer[ ] to the genus of which the
particular product [or service] is a species." 7 Thus, a plaintiff claiming
trademark or service mark rights to a generic word will be precluded from
securing relief.'
The policy behind preventing competitors from claiming and protecting
generic words as marks is readily apparent. Because generic terms
delineate general categories of goods or services, they do not differentiate
or identify the goods or services of any one provider and therefore cannot
function as trademarks or service marks.9 Thus, the rationale for denying
Id. Because the differences between these types of marks and the more conventional
trademarks and service marks are not relevant for purposes of this Article, the term "marks"
as used herein collectively refers to all of these designations unless otherwise noted.
6. "Mhe essential question in any case of alleged trademark infringement brought
under the Lanham Act or under the law of unfair competition is 'whether a substantial
number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled or confused as to the source
of the different products.'" Information Clearing House, Inc. v Find Magazine, 492 F
Supp. 147, 154 (S.D.N.Y 1977) (quoting Mushroom Makers, Inc. v R.G. Barry Corp.,
441 F Supp. 1220, 1225 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 580 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1116 (1979)). For the tests employed by the various circuits to determine whether
confusion is likely, see Boston Athletic Ass'n v Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1989);
Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 925 (10th Cir. 1986); Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 775 F.2d 247, 248 (8th Cir. 1985); Fuji Photo Film Co. v
Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 1985); Pizzeria Uno Corp.
v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984); Interpace Corp. v Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d
460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983); Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v Elby's Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642,
648 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982); AMF, Inc. v Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d
341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d
1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978); In re E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973); Polaroid Corp. v Polarad Elec.
Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
7 Park 'N Fly, Inc. v Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985).
8. See, e.g., Bayer Co. v United Drug Co., 272 F 505, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)
(declining to enforce rights to putative ASPIRIN mark); Du Pont Cellophane Co. v Waxed
Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir.) (denying relief to owner of putative mark CELLO-
PHANE), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936). Perhaps the earliest statement of this prmciple
in an American court occurred in the celebrated "Dessicated Codfish Case," which denied
the plaintiff exclusive rights to that phrase. See Town v. Stetson, 5 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 218, 220
(N.Y Common Pleas Ct. 1868).
9. See, e.g., Bayer, 272 F at 514 (holding that plaintiff cannot "deprive [a]
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protection to generic words is firmly grounded in competitive necessity
As the Restatement of Unfair Competition has noted of this policy-
Recognition of exclusive rights in generic terms would impede
competition in the market for the goods or services denominated by the
generic designation. Competitors denied access to a term that identifies
the goods or services to prospective purchasers would be left at a distinct
disadvantage in communicating information regarding the nature or
characteristics of their product. Consumers would be forced either to
expend additional time and money investigating the characteristics of
competing goods or to pay a premium price to the seller with trademark
rights in the accepted generic terminology "o
Significantly, the economic necessity of guaranteeing access to generic
designations trumps the otherwise pervasive policy of unfair competition
law that encourages competitors to develop enforceable rights to their
trademarks and service marks through promotion and careful cultivation."
"[N]o matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has
poured into promoting the sale of its merchandise and what success it has
achieved in securing public identification, it cannot deprive competing
manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article by its name."'
2
defendant, and the trade m general, of the right effectually to dispose of [a product] by the
only description which will be understood").
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15 cmt. a, at 85 (Tentative
Draft No. 2 1990) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. As another commentator has observed:
The extent to wich the owner of a mark is given exclusive rights in it is
determined by a tension between the desire to secure to producers the benefits
of their labors by preventing consumer deception as to the source of goods,
and the desire to keep free the means of expression necessary for effective
competition. The public interest in preventing consumer deception or injury
has rarely been thought of as the primary rationale behind trademark
protection.
Note, Recent Development in the Law: Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 68 HARv
L. REv 814, 816 (1955).
I1. In cases mn which generic designations are not concerned, trademarks and service
marks generally are regarded as "the essence of competition To protect trade-marks
[and service marks], therefore, is to protect the public from deceit, to foster fair
competition, and to secure to the business community the advantages of reputation and
good will by preventing their diversion from those who have created them to those who
have not." S. REP No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1946) nmcroformed on CIS No.
11015 (Congressional Info. Serv.).
12. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
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Simply put, the generic name for a product or service cannot become a
trademark or service mark.1
3
Consistent with its policy of precluding the protection of generic
designations, unfair competition law also imposes costs on plaintiffs seeking
to protect marks that are "merely descriptive" of their associated goods or
services. 4 These types of marks identify the "qualities, ingredients, effects,
or other features" of the product or service, the "problem or condition"
remedied by the product or service, or "the use to which the product or
service is put.""5 They also include the personal names of providers of the
relevant goods or services, 6 as well as terms corresponding to their
geographic origin.17
13. See, e.g., A.J. Canfield Co. v Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 297 (3d Cir. 1986);
Technical Publishing Co. v. Lebhar-Friedman, Inc., 729 F.2d 1136, 1139 (7th Cir. 1984);
Weiss Noodle Co. v Golden Cracknel & Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845, 847-48 (C.C.P.A.
1961).
14. See, e.g., Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S.
538, 543-44 (1920). Descriptive marks are far from uncommon. As Judge Learned Hand
once observed of these designations:
I have always been at a loss to know why so many marks are adopted which
have an aura, or more, of description about them. With the whole field of
possible coinage before them, it is strange that merchants insist upon adopting
marks that are so nearly descriptive. Probably they wish to interject into the
name of their goods some intimation of excellence, and [they] are willing to
incur the risk.
Franklin Knitting Mills, Inc. v Fashionit Sweater Mills, Inc., 297 F 247, 248 (S.D.N.Y
1923), aft'd, 4 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1925).
15. 20th Century Wear, Inc. v Sanmark-Stardust Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 88 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); see also Zatarains, Inc. v Oak Grove
Smokehouse, Inc. 698 F.2d 786, 792 (5th Cir. 1983).
16. Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv. Banking Corp., 931 F.2d 1519, 1522 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 639 (1991); see also ConAgra, Inc. v Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508,
1513 (11th Cir. 1984).
17 As the Supreme Court has noted of geographical designations:
Their nature is such that they cannot point to the origin (personal origin) or
ownership of the articles of trade to which they may be applied. They point
only at the place of production, not to the producer, and could they be
appropriated exclusively, the appropriation would result in mischievous
monopolies.
Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 324 (1871); see also Continental Motors Corp.
v. Continental Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857, 860-62 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding CONTINEN-
TAL mark to be descriptive); Continental Ins. Co. v Continental Fire Ass'n, 101 F 255,
257 (5th Cir. 1900) (same).
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Obviously, just as with generic terms, "[a]ppropnation of descriptive
words can limit the ability of others to emphasize the characteristics
of their own goods, services, or business by restricting the manner in
which the descriptive term may be used or displayed."" Because of the
competitive need for industry participants to have access to descriptive
words,19 a plaintiff using such a word as a mark will be able to protect it
only if the word acquired a "secondary meamng" other than its primary
descriptive one,2' prior to the time at which the defendant's use began.2"
Although the concept of this acquired distinctiveness defies easy
definition, secondary meaning generally is found to exist if, in the minds
of the public, the primary significance of a term is to identify the source
of the product or service rather than the product or service itself.' Thus,
a plaintiff owner of a descriptive mark will be able to proceed in an
infringement suit only if, by virtue of its long-standing use and advertising
expenditures, it can demonstrate that "the primary significance of the term
Significantly, some courts have held that "t]here are certain words, which while
containing the germ of geographic significance, cannot be identified with any specific
geographic unit or are not used in a descriptive sense." World Carpets, Inc. v Dick
Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 486 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Spice Islands
Co. v. Spice Land Prods., Inc., 262 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1959) (SPICE ISLANDS mark for
spice); Health Indus., Inc. v European Health Spas, 489 F Supp. 860 (D.S.D. 1980)
(EUROPEAN mark for health spas).
18. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 14 cmt. a, at 57-58.
19. At least three circuits have held that "whether competitors would be likely to need
the terms used m the [mark]" is probative of the degree to which a particular designation
is "merely descriptive" of its associated goods or services. See Vision Ctr. v Opticks, Inc.,
596 F.2d 111, 116 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 (1980); Union Carbide
Corp. v Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 379 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830
(1976); accord Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv. Banking Corp., 931 F.2d 1519, 1523 (1lth
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 639 (1991).
20. See, e.g., Freedom Say. and Loan Ass'n v Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1182 n.5 (lth
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985); see also Coca Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of Am., 254
U.S. 143, 146 (1920).
21. See, e.g., Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1231 (3d
Cir. 1978).
22. See Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982); see also
Charcoal Steak House, Inc. v. Staley, 139 S.E.2d 185, 187 (N.C. 1964) ("When a particular
business has used words publici jurs for so long or so exclusively or when it has promoted
its product to such an extent that the words do not register their literal meaning on the
public mind but are instantly associated with one enterprise, such words have attained a
secondary meaning.").
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in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the
producer. "I
Significantly, even if the owner of a descriptive mark has succeeded
in creating the requisite secondary meaning, it still may not enjoy the right
of wholesale appropriation of that mark. Rather, because preventing
competitors from using the same words in their primary descriptive sense
would needlessly ifnpede communication in the marketplace, infringement
actions to protect descriptive marks at common law are subject to the so-
called "fair use" defense.' Pursuant to tius doctrine, a defendant may
escape liability in a suit brought by the plaintiff owner of a descriptive
mark if the defendant's mark is used fairly and in good faith merely to
describe its own goods or services.' Moreover, "a name may be
arbitrary or fanciful as applied to one or more products, but not yet be
entitled to unlimited protection as against its good faith tradename
adoption and use upon a product of which, because of its inherent
properties, is plainly and accurately descriptive in ordinary meamng. "26
A lower threshold for protection attaches to word marks considered
to be "suggestive" of their associated goods and services. Suggestive
23. Vision Ctr, 596 F.2d at 118; accord American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v Heritage
Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 12 (5th Cir. 1974).
Although the precise factors used by courts to determine whether a descriptive mark
has, in fact, achieved the requisite secondary meaning differ, the test applied by the
Eleventh Circuit is characteristic:
The factors to consider are: (1) the length and manner of its use; (2) the
nature and extent of advertising and promotion; (3) the efforts made by the
plaintiff to promote a conscious connection m the public's mind between the
name and the plaintiff's product or business; and (4) the extent to which the
public actually identifies the name with the plaintiff's product or venture.
ConAgra, Inc. v Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1513 (11th Cir. 1984); see also American
Television & Communications Corp. v. American Communications & Television, Inc., 810
F.2d 1546, 1548 (l1th Cir. 1987); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v Rickard, 492 F.2d
474, 478 (5th Cir. 1974).
24. See REsTATEmENT, supra note 10, § 14 cmt. a, at 58.
25. See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Sta-Brite Fluorescent Mfg., 308 F.2d 377,
382 (5th Cir. 1962) (observing, in dictum, that "the plaintiff cannot secure any right to the
exclusive use of such a descriptive term as 'bright' when applied to any kind of light, and
when not used in such a manner as 'is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive
purchasers'") (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
26. Creamette Co. v. Conlin, 191 F.2d 108, 112 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 945 (1952).
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marks also convey information, but unlike their descriptive counterparts,
they do not do so by using competitively necessary terminology Rather:
It cannot be said that they are primarily descriptive or that they are
purely arbitrary or fanciful without any indication of the nature of the
goods which they denominate. Such terms, indeed, shed some light on
the characteristics of the goods, but so applied they involve an element
of incongruity, and in order to be understood as descriptive, they must
be taken in a suggestive or figurative sense through an effort of the
inagmation 27
Consequently, such a relationship with its goods or services does not render
a suggestive word mark ineligible for protection and, in fact, "suggestive
words may be and frequently are very good trademarks."I
Finally, also protectable even in the absence of secondary meaning are
"arbitrary" and "coined" marks.29 An arbitrary mark "is a word in
common use, but applied to a product or service unrelated to its meaning,
so that the word neither describes nor suggests the products or service. "30
In contrast, "coined" words are "purely fanciful" words with no apparent
31 3meaning, including such famous marks as EXXON,32 KODAK,33 and
XEROX.' Coined terms are particularly favored by unfair competition law
m substantial part because their monopolization does not inpose competitive
penalties on the rest of the industry" "Recognition of trademark rights in [a]
fanciful term[ ] protects the significance of the designation as a symbol of
27 General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, 111 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.), reh'g denied, 112 F.2d
561 (4th Cir. 1940); see also Stix Prods., Inc. v United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F
Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y 1968) ("A term is suggestive if it requires nagination, thought
and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of [the] goods.").
28. Continental Scale Corp. v Weight Watchers Int'l Inc., 517 F.2d 1378, 1380
(C.C.P.A. 1975).
29. See, e.g., Coach House Restaurant, Inc. -v Coach & Six Restaurants, Inc., 934
F.2d 1551, 1559-60 (lth Cir. 1991).
30. Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 611 n.2 (7th Cir. 1965);
accord Jellibeans, Inc. v Skating Clubs, 716 F.2d 833, 841 n.18 (1lth Cir. 1983).
31. Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252,260 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 899 (1980).
32. See Exxon Corp. v Xoil Energy Resources, Inc., 552 F Supp. 1008, 1014
(S.D.N.Y 1981).
33. See Soweco, Inc. v Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981).
34. See Amstar, 615 F.2d at 260.
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identification without diminishing the vocabulary by which competitors can
convey information about similar products."3I
The lower threshold for the "inherently distinctive" categories of
suggestive, arbitrary, and corned marks to qualify for protection is
consistent with the primary economic rationale of unfair competition law
Specifically, through the use of these marks, producers can
reduce the cost of information to consumers by making it easy for them
to identify the products or producers with which they have had either
good experiences, so that they want to keep buying the product or
bad experiences, so that they want to avoid the product or the producer
In the fUture.
36
"By identifying the source of the goods, [inherently distinctive trademarks]
convey valuable iformation to consumers at lower costs. Easily identified
trademarks reduce the costs consumers incur in searching for what they
desire, and the lower the costs of search the more competitive the
market. ,
B. Trade Dresses
Although the most common and publicly recognized indicators of
origin of a producer's goods or services are verbal trademarks and service
marks, both the common law and the Lanham Act extend protection to
"trade dresses" as well. In contrast to trademarks and service marks, which
are expressly defined by the Act, the concept of protectable trade dress is
largely a judicial creation. Although not lending itself to succinct
definition, trade dress generally is the overall image used to present a
product or service to purchasers.38 In its most common form, trade dress
consists of the particular packaging and labels associated with a particular
product,39 It also, however, can include such characteristics of a good as
35. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 13 cmt. c, at 40.
36. W.T. Rogers Co. v Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1985).
37 Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429-30 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147 (1986).
38. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2755 n.1
(1992); John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983).
39. "[T]he majority of trade dress claims involve a manufacturer's container or
packaging for a product." Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d
821, 831 (11th Cir. 1982). For representative cases addressing the protectability of
container appearances, see generally AmBrit, Inc. v Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir.
1986) (foil wrapper for frozen ice cream bar), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Sun-Fun
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its size, shape, and color.' In less common situations, cognizable trade
dress can even consist of the physical appearance of buildings associated
with a plaintiff's services41 or a plaintiff's unique sales techniques.42
As with word marks, trade dresses are protectable only if they are
distinctive of their associated goods and services. Distinctiveness may be
inherent in a trade dress, in which case a plaintiff need not demonstrate
secondary meaning.43 Inherent distinctiveness mn turn may be determined
by treating the trade dress in the manner as a word mark, classifying it as
either descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or coined." It also may be
Prods., Inc. v Suntan Research & Dev Inc., 656 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981)
,(exterior of suntan lotion bottle).
40. See, e.g., Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165 (11th Cir. 1991) (per
curam) (configuration of electric lamp); Brunswick Corp. v. Spmit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513
(10th Cir. 1987) (configuration of fishing reel cover); LeSportsac, Inc. v K Mart Corp.,
754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985) (appearance of gym bag); Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v Suave Shoe
Corp., 716 F.2d 854 (11th Cir. 1983) ("V" design affixed to side of running shoe); John
H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1983) (appearance of bank
checks); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir. 1979) (appearance of cheerleaders' uniforms); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v
Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977) (design of chicken cartons and
napkins); Truck Equip. Serv Co. v Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.) (shape of
truck trailer), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Alum-A-Fold Shutter Corp. v Folding
Shutter Corp., 441 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1971) (configuration of aluminum shutters).
41. For representative cases addressing the protectability of restaurant appearance as
trade dress, see, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992);
Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1987); Prufrock Ltd.
v Lasater, 781 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1986); T.G.I. Friday's, Inc. v International Restaurant
Group, Inc., 569 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1978); McDonald's Corp. v Moore, 363 F.2d 435 (5th
Cir. 1966); White Tower Sys., Inc. v White Castle Sys. of Eating Houses Corp., 90 F.2d
67 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 720 (1937); House of Hunan, Inc. v Hunan at
Pavilion, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 803, 805-06 (D.D.C. 1985); Warehouse Restaurant v
Customs House Restaurant, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 411, 419 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
42. Compare Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821,
831 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding "adoption" procedures associated with plaintiff's dolls
protectable as trade dress) with Haagen-Dazs, Inc. v Frusen Gladje, Ltd., 493 F Supp. 73
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (declining to protect plaintiff's use of Scandinavian motif in marketing of
ice cream).
43. See Two Pesos, Inc. v Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2761 (1992).
44. See, e.g., Paddington Corp. v Attiki Importers & Distribs., 996 F.2d 577, 583
(2d Cir. 1993) (acknowledging possibility of trade dress being "generic"); AmBrit, Inc. v
Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1537 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that trade dress of plaintiff's
wrapper design "does not describe the [plaintiff's] ice cream product, rather it suggests to
the consumer the coldness of the product. Such trade dress is inherently distinctive "),
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evaluated by examining whether the plaintiff's design is "common" or
unique in a particular field or, alternatively, whether the design is a mere
refinement of a commonly adopted and well-known form of ornamentation
for a particular class of goods viewed by the public as such.45 Competitors
seeking to protect trade dress found not to be inherently distinctive are
subject to the same condition as owners of descriptive word marks, namely
the requirement that they demonstrate secondary meaning.'
As with the generic classification of word marks, there are circum-
stances under which a trade dress will not be protectable, namely if it is
found to be "functional" or, in other words, if "it is essential to the use or
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article. "47
Protection thus will not attach to a particular design that is a necessary
result of the least expensive and most efficient way to manufacture the
product.' Nor may a plaintiff protect a design found to be the "best" one
possible,49 particularly if to do so would hinder competition or impinge
upon the rights of others to compete effectively in the sale of similar goods
or services.
50
The requirement of nonfunctionality reflects the principle that federal
law encourages the liberal use of functional designs unless the owners of
those designs have secured utility patents for their creations."' Specifically,
cert. demed, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v Suntan Research & Dev Inc.,
656 F.2d 186, 191 n.5 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981) (observing, m dictum, that trade dress
of plaintiff's suntan bottles "arguably has many of the indicia of a suggestive mark and is
therefore entitled to protection").
45. See, e.g., Wiley v American Greetings Corp., 762 F.2d 139, 140-41 (1st Cir.
1985); Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 857-58 (11th Cir. 1983);
Seabrook Foods, Inc. v Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
46. See, e.g., Brooks Shoe, 716 F.2d at 858.
47 Inwood Lab. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982) (dictum).
48. J.R. Clark Co. v. Murray Metal Prods. Co., 219 F.2d 313, 320 (5th Cir. 1955).
49. See, e.g., United States Golf Ass'n v St. Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028, 1034
(3d Cir. 1984) (upholding summary judgment of functionality on ground that even if
alternatives exist to perform function in question, "a particular method of serving that
function may be superior to others").
50. See, e.g., Schwmnn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1191 (7th
Cir. 1989); Hartford House, Ltd. v Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1274 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988); Brunswick Corp. v Spmit Reel Co., 832 F.2d
513, 519 (10th Cir. 1987); Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423,
426 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986); Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 133 (8th Cir. 1986).
51. As Professor McCarthy has observed, "the primary rationale behind the public
policy requirement of non-functionality is the need to accommodate trademark and unfair
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federal laws "protect more than the right of the public to contemplate the
abstract beauty of an otherwise unprotected intellectual creation-they
assure its efficient reduction to practice and sale in the marketplace."'52
Therefore, m the absence of a utility patent, use of a functional design is
"legitimate competitive activity "I
This principle applies even in cases in which a defendant intentionally
and willfully nmsappropriates a plaintiff's design. As the Eighth Circuit has
explained:
[The appropnation of a competitor's unpatented improvements] is
one of the privileges of our system of competitive enterprise. It insures
to the public the benefit of all natural, useful progress in the industrial
and commercial arts. Any article, structure or design, which is
unpatented, may accordingly be Imitated or appropnated in its functional
aspects, if no unfair competition [e.g., palming off] is involved in the
manner of its use. In permitting unpatented functional features to
be subjected to competitive commercial appropriation, the law treats a
non-functional aspect of goods as constituting in effect a mere form of
merchandising or a business method.'
This observation was echoed by the First Circuit in Fisher Stoves, Inc. v
All Nighter Stove Works, Inc.,' in which the court denied relief to the
manufacturer of a wood-burning stove:
Because of the consuming public's "interest in free competition and in
econonnc and technological progress," functional features which are not
the subject of a valid [utility] patent or copyright may be imitated with
impunity
competition law with utility patent law. In the U.S. system of intellectual property, there
is only one legal source of exclusive rights for functional, utilitarian shapes and features:
utility patent law." 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 7.26[l], at 7-113 (3d ed. 1992).
52. Bonito Boats, Inc. v Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 164 (1989).
53. Inwood Lab., Inc. v Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 863 (1982) (White, J.,
concurring).
54. J.C. Penney Co. v H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 953-54 (8th Cir.
1941); see also Keene Corp. v Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981);
American Safety Table Co. v Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 915 (1959); West Point Mfg. Co. v Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581, 589 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 840 (1955); Pope Automatic Merchandising Co. v McCrum-
Howell Co., 191 F 979, 981-82 (7th Cir. 1911), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 730 (1912).
55. 626 F.2d 193 (lst Cir. 1980).
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Plaintiff designed a stove with several functional innovations. These
were enthusiastically received in the marketplace. Defendant, in
imitating them, is doubtless sharing in the market formerly captured by
the plaintiffs skill and judgment. While we sympathize with plaintiff's
disappointment at losing sales to an imitator, this is a fact of business
life.56
Thus, under federal law, "[i]t must not be forgotten that there is
absolutely nothing legally or morally reprehensible about exact copying of
things in the public domain."
Moreover, if the expiration (or absence) of a utility patent precludes
protection for functional designs under federal unfair competition law, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that an identical rule holds under state law
as well. Beginning with its Sears-Compco decisions in 1964,58 the Court
consistently has held that "[just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal
patent laws directly, it cannot, under some other law, such as that
forbidding unfair competition, give protection of a kind that clashes with
the objectives of the federal patent laws."59 Thus, as a practical matter:
(1) states may not extend protection to functional or utilitarian designs in
the public domain whose inventors have chosen not to seek utility patent
protection;' and (2) state law is preempted to the extent that it attempts to
provide protection to designations that are not inherently distinctive or do
not otherwise possess secondary meaning.6' In cases in which functional
designs are at issue, states and the federal government alike therefore may
act only to prohibit defendants from affirmatively palming off their wares.62
56. Fisher Stoves, Inc. v All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195-96 (lst
Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).
57 Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 860 (lth Cir. 1983)
(quoting I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETION § 15:4, at 531
(1973)).
58. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp.
v Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
59 Sears, 376 U.S. at 231.
60. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156-57 (1989).
61. See id. at 157
62. As the Court conceded in Sears:
Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that goods, whether
patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other precautionary steps be taken to
prevent customers from being misled as to the source, just as it may protect
businesses in the use of their trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the
packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by imitating such markings, from
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HI. Federal Registration Under the Lanham Act
A. The Registration Process
Although the 1946 Lanham Act "was enacted for the purpose of
codifying, modernizing and maproving the trade-mark statutes of the United
States,"'63 nowhere are the Seventy-ninth Congress's goals of modernization
and unprovement more apparent than in the registration process. Despite
the Constitution's provision for federal protection of patents and copy-
nghts,' that document makes no mention of trademarks or service marks,
much less contemplates a national register for such designations. In the
absence of express constitutional guidance, Secretary of State Thomas
Jefferson proposed a system of registration at the various federal district
courts limited to those marks used in international and interstate commerce,
as well as with the various Native American tribes.65
In its first efforts to codify this informal registration system under the
Commerce Clause,' Congress initially adhered so literally to that
provision's express text67 that m 1881 it granted the Comnussioner of
Patents6" the authority only to register trademarks used m commerce with
misleading purchasers as to the source of the goods.
Sears, 376 U.S. at 232.
63. Burgess Battery Co. v. Marzall, 101 F Supp. 812, 813 (D.D.C. 1951), aff'd, 204
F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 822 (1953).
64. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
65. See HAL MORGAN, SYMBOLS OF AMERICA 9-10 (1986). Jefferson envisioned a
system "permitting the owner of every manufactory to enter in the record of the court of the
district wherein his manufactory is, the name with which he chooses to mark or designate
his wares, and rendering it penal to others to put the same mark on any other wares."
EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADE-MARKS, AND UNFAIR TRADING 47-48 (1914)
(citation omitted). Registration of marks with local courts apparently also was the rule for
mark owners anxious to protect their marks under state law: "In 1772, George Washington,
then only a farmer and businessman, went to the [Fairfax County, Virginia] court to get a
trademark for his brand of flour, which he proposed to name, simply 'G. Washington.' The
presiding Justices so ordered." Thomas Grubisich, Washington's Flour- Court Records of
1700s Put in Order, CHI. SUN-TimEs, Apr. 23, 1976, at 46.
66. For a discussion of congressional efforts to enact trademark legislation under the
auspices of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, see infra notes 259-63 and
accompanying text.
67 The Commerce Clause grants Congress the plenary power to "regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
68. Pursuant to Pub. L. No. 93-596, 88 Stat. 1949 (1975), the office of "Commission-
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foreign nations or with Native American tribes.69 These limitations did not
change until passage of the Trademark Act of 1905,70 when Congress
opened the Patent Office's registers to owners of all marks used m interstate
commerce, subject to certain restrictions.71 Of perhaps equal significance,
and in contrast to the 1881 Act, which contained little more than cursory
registration provisions, the 1905 Act set forth detailed procedures governing
applications to register marks.'
Despite this apparent liberalization, however, the 1905 Act also for the
first tune allowed interested parties to block the registration of particular
marks. Section 6 of the 1905 Act, for example, provided that "[a]ny
person who believes he would be damaged by the registration of a mark
may oppose the same by filing [a] notice of opposition, stating the grounds
therefor, in the Patent Office."73 Interested parties failing timely to notice
their opposition to a pending application did not necessarily forfeit their
rights to challenge the applied-for registration, however, because the
Commissioner of Patents enjoyed the authority to declare "interferences"
between competing would-be registrants. 74 Moreover, under section 13 of
the 1905 Act, "whenever any person shall deem himself mjured by the
registration of a trade-mark in the Patent Office he may at any time apply
to the Commissioner of Patents to cancel the registration thereof. "I
Opposition, interference, and cancellation actions initially were heard by the
supervising examiner for interferences, with appeals possible to the
er of Patents" became the "Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks," and the "Patent
Office" similarly became the "Patent and Trademark Office." For the sake of convenience,
this Article uses the terminology established by contemporary law.
69. See Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502.
70. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 [hereinafter 1905 Act].
71. Section 5 of the 1905 Act barred from registration only those marks that:
(1) consisted of unmoral or scandalous matter; (2) consisted of the flag or coat of arms of
the United States or that of any state, municipality, or foreign nation; (3) were confusingly
similar to a prior registered mark; (4) were descriptive; or (5) consisted of a portrait of a
living individual without his or her consent. See td. § 5, 33 Stat. at 725-26. In contrast to
the substantively identical restrictions enacted as part of the Lanham Act, see nfra notes 79-
84 and accompanying text, a mark otherwise falling afoul of § 5 of the 1905 Act
nevertheless would be eligible for registration if it had been in use for ten years prior to the
Act's passage. See 1905 Act § 5, 33 Stat. at 726.
72. See 1905 Act §§ 1-4, 33 Stat. at 724-25.
73. Id. § 6, 33 Stat. at 726.
74. See id. § 7, 33 Stat. at 726.
75. Id. § 13, 33 Stat. at 728.
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Commissioner and then to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.76
With the passage of the Trademark Act of 1920," Congress undertook
to provide guidance on an issue largely unaddressed by the 1905 Act,
namely on what grounds an "injured" interested party could preclude the
registration of a particular mark. It did so, however, only in the cancella-
tion context, with a provision that made no reference to the grounds upon
which the Commissioner might have demed registration in the first place.
Specifically, section 2 of the 1920 Act provided:
If it appear[s] after a hearing before the examiner that the registrant was
not entitled to the exclusive use of the mark at or since the date of his
application for registration thereof, or that the mark is not used by the
reglstrant[ ] or has been abandoned, and the examiner shall so decide,
the commissioner shall cancel the registration.
78
The Seventy-ninth Congress built upon tins framework with its 1946
passage of the Lanham Act. Like its predecessors, the Lanham Act
provides generally for an expansive system of registration with relatively
few express limitations on the types of marks eligible for registration.79
Some of these restrictions reflect "political" determinations by Congress,
such as the content-based bars contained in subsections (a)-(c) of section 2
of the Act.' For the most part, however, the Act's prohibitions are firmly
76. See zd. § 6, 33 Stat. at 726; id. § 7, 33 Stat. at 726; id. § 9, 33 Stat. at 727; id.
§ 13, 33 Stat. at 728.
77 Act of Mar. 19, 1920, ch. 104, 41 Stat. 533 [hereinafter 1920 Act].
78. Id. § 2, 41 Stat. at 534.
79. "Mhe registration scheme of the Trademark Act is one more inclined to inclusion
than exclusion, the obvious idea being to give as comprehensive notice as possible of
the trademarks and service marks in which others have claimed rights." In re Old Glory
Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216, 1220 n.3 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
80. These provisions bar from the federal registers matter that:
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or
matter [that] may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living
or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt,
or disrepute[;"
(b) Consists of or comprises the flag of the United States, or of any
State or municipality, or of any foreign nation, or any simulation thereof[; and]
(c) Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a
particular living individual except by his written consent, or the name, signature,
or portrait of a deceased President of the United States during the life of his
widow, if any, except by the written consent of the widow.
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grounded in the common law's goal of precluding confusion in the
marketplace without allowing the monopolization of competitively necessary
language, as reflected in the remainder of section 2:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distm-
guished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the
principal register on account of its nature unless it-
(d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark
registered m the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name
previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as
to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the
applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive .[;
and]
(e) Consists of a mark which (1) when used on or in connection with
the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively msde-
scriptive of them, (2) when used on or in connection with the goods of
the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive of them,
(3) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of them, or (4) is
primarily merely a surname.8'
Consistent with the common law's treatment of descriptive marks, the
Act allows their owners to escape from section 2(e)'s statutory bar upon a
demonstration of secondary meaning.' Descriptive marks lacking
secondary meaning are eligible for the so-called "Supplemental Register,"
a roll for marks capable over time of distinguishing their owner's goods and
services.' Once a mark registered on the Supplemental Register has
aclueved secondary meaning, its registration may be converted at any time
to the Principal Register.'
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)-(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
81. Id. § 1052(d)-(e).
82. See id. § 1052(0. Consistent with the methodology used by courts evaluating the
protection afforded to descriptive marks, see supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text, the
PTO generally considers probative of secondary meaning such factors as an applicant's
advertising expenditures, sales of the goods in question, and the nature of the applicant's
use. See In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In
re Hollywood Brands, Inc., 214 F.2d 139, 141 (C.C.P.A. 1954); In re Motorola Inc., 3
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1142, 1143 (T.T.A.B. 1986); 37 C.F.R. § 2.41 (1993).
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 1091(c) (1988).
84. 37 C.F.R. § 2.75 (1993). Because "[t]he Commissioner may accept as prina facie
evidence that the mark has become distinctive, as used on or in connection with the
applicant's goods in commerce, proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof
1273
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1257 (1994)
Would-be registrants on the Principal Register can fall afoul of the
Act's prohibitions on registration in three ways. First, an incoming
application will be assigned by the PTO to an Examining Attorney for an
ex parte determinationP of whether the mark applied for complies with the
Act's substantive barriers to registration. 6 Initially unsuccessful applicants
are entitled to respond with appropriate legal arguments or additional
subrmissions.' Tins process continues until: (1) the applicant abandons the
application; (2) the Examining Attorney withdraws the objection(s) upon
reconsideration; or (3) the application receives a final rejection,88 upon
which the applicant may appeal to the PTO's administrative appellate
body, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Board). 9  If the mark
ultimately is approved for registration, the PTO notices that approval by
publishing the mark in its Official Gazette, with a registration normally
issuing within six months.'
as a mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which the
claim of distinctiveness is made," 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), owners
of descriptive marks frequently escape the distinctiveness bar merely by retaining a
supplemental registration for five years and then converting their registrations to the
Principal Register.
85. For purposes of this article, the term "ex parte" refers to cases in which an
applicant challenges the PTO's determination that the applicant's mark is not entitled to
registration. In contrast, the term "interpartes" refers to conflicts between: (1) competing
applicants for regrstration; (2) an applicant and another party seeking to block registration
of the applicant's mark; and (3) a federal registrant and another party seeking to cancel
the registrant's registration.
86. See generally Glenwood Lab., Inc. v American Home Prods. Corp., 455 F.2d
1384, 1387 (C.C.P.A. 1972). Examimng Attorneys also are responsible for determining
whether the application (as opposed to the underlying mark) complies with the purely
formal requirements of the application process. Thus, for example, the PTO's Trademark
Examining Section might reject an application because it does not include the required
specimens demonstrating that the mark is being used in conjunction with the specified
goods or services. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.56 (1993).
87 See 15 U.S.C. § 1062 (1988).
88. See JAMES E. HAwEs, TRADEMARK REGISTRATION PRACTICE § 1.08[2], at 1-14
to 1-15 (1991); 2 McCARTHY, supra note 51, § 19:40[1], at 19-214.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1070 (1988). An applicant whose application has foundered on
purely procedural requirements still may petition the Commissioner to waive the
requirement. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.146 (1993). The Commissioner does not, however, have
the authority to waive statutory requirements. See, e.g., In re Kruysman, Inc., 199
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 110 (Comm'r Pat. 1977).
90. 37 C.F.R. § 2.80 (1993).
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At this stage, the second possible method of blocking a registration
comes into play Like its 1905 predecessor, the Lanham Act allows any
party who believes that she will be damaged by the registration of a mark
or trade dress to challenge an application to register the mark or trade
dress in a formal inter partes proceeding before the Board after the mark's
publication in the Official Gazette.9 The Act does not expressly define
the circumstances under which an opposer may block an application.
Under prevailing case law, however, and assuming that the opposer can
satisfy the constitutional requirements of standing,' she may proceed by
alleging any legal defect that might bar the application's maturation into
a registration, including any of the grounds set forth in section 2 of the
Act.91
Similarly, the same party facing an existing registration of the mark
less than five years old and allegedly issued in violation of the Act's
provisions may petition to cancel it under section 14 of the Act94 by
alleging that the registration was improperly issued.95 In contrast to
opposition proceedings, which must be brought before the Board in its
capacity as an administrative fact finder, petitions for cancellation may be
brought in federal court "[i]n any action involving a registered mark."96
Thus, although a would-be petitioner for cancellation may not wholly
bypass the Act's administrative cancellation procedures by filing a
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 2.101-.107 (1993).
92. Standing to oppose generally is restricted to parties who can demonstrate "a
personal interest in the outcome [of the proceeding] beyond that of the general public."
Lipton Indus. Inc. v. Ralston Purna Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 1028 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
93. See, e.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635,
1638 (T.T.A.B. 1988). Significantly, a successful opposition to an application does not
prevent the applicant from continuing to use its mark:
The refusal of registration does not serve to protect the public
because refusal to register has almost no effect on trademark use, which use
always precedes [the) application to register, continues during the prosecution
of the application, and usually goes on after registration is finally refused,
unless something other than that refusal intervenes to stop such use
In re National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 297 F.2d 941, 948 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (Rich, J.,
concumng).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1988); see also 37 C.F.R. § 2.111-.115 (1993).
95. See International Order of Job's Daughters v Lindeburg & Co., 727 F.2d 1087,
1091 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (1988).
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declaratory judgment action m federal, court,' counterclaims for cancella-
tion of a plaintiff's registration are frequent responses to infringement
suits.98
If dissatisfied with a decision by the Board, parties to inter partes
proceedings and unsuccessful applicants may appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.' Alternatively, they also may
elect to have their cases heard on a de novo basis by a federal district
court."°° Cancellation actions initially heard by federal district courts as
97 See Universal Sewing Mach. Co. v. Standard Sewing Equip. Corp., 185 F Supp.
257, 259-60 (S.D.N.Y 1960); see also Jeno's Inc. v Commissioner of Patents &
Trademarks, 498 F Supp. 472, 478 (D. Minn. 1980); Homemakers, Inc. v Chicago Home
for the Friendless, 313 F Supp. 1087, 1089 (N.D. Ill. 1970), af4'd, 169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 831 (1971).
98. See, e.g., Keebler Co. v Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1980).
Significantly, and notwithstanding frequent semantic confusion over this point, see, e.g.,
F.T. Alexandra Mahaney, Comment, Incontestability: The Park N Fly Decision, 33 UCLA
L. REV 1149, 1163-64 (1986), cancellation attaches to a mark's registration and not to the
mark itself:
It is important to keep in mind that what is in issue m a cancellation
proceeding is the cancellation of a registration, not the cancellation of a
trademark. Although a federal registration will give the owner of a mark
important legal rights and benefits, the registration does not [alone] create the
trademark. Thus, the cancellation of a registration does not invalidate state or
federal rights m the trademark which do not flow from federal registration.
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 51, § 20.12[I], at 20-74; see also In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481,
484 (C.C.P.A. 1981) ("ITrhe PTO's refusal to register [an applicant's] mark does not affect
his right to use it. No conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of expression is
suppressed.") (citation omitted); In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470, 1472 (T.T.A.B.
1988) (Cissel, Member, concurring) ("This is not a [case] involving the right to free
speech. Applicant has used and might well continue to use this mark whether or not we find
it is entitled to registration under the Lanham Act."); In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 863, 865-66 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (applicant's right to use mark unrelated to refusal to
register).
99. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Prior to October 1, 1982, appeals from the Board were heard by the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.). On that date, however, the C.C.P.A. merged with the United
States Claims Court to form the new United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). Pursuant to the Federal Circuit's decision in South
Corp. v United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc), all decisions of the
C.C.P.A. are binding precedent in the Federal Circuit.
100. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1071(b), 1121 (1988). An appellant electing to proceed before
the Federal Circuit thereby waives his right to an appeal before a district court. Id.
§ 1071(b)(1). Nevertheless, an interpartes appellee may direct the appeal to a district court
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counterclaims to infringement suits are subject to the same appellate process
applicable to all such suits," 1 a process that ultimately led to the Fourth
Circuit's reversal of the District Court for the District of South Carolina in
Shakespeare.
B. "Incontestability"
Owners of marks and trade dresses registered on the Principal Register
enjoy a number of advantages over their unregistered counterparts. Federal
registrants, for example, enjoy the benefits of the anti-infringement cause
of action established by section 32 of the Act." Registration also confers
nationwide constructive notice of use and ownership of the underlying mark
or trade dress, thereby precluding defendants in infringement suits from
claiming good faith ignorance of the registrant's rights. m  A federal court
hearing charges of the infringement of a registered mark or trade dress
enjoys jurisdiction over the conflict without regard to the residence of the
even if the appellant has appealed to the Federal Circuit by filing a notice of appeal m the
district court within 20 days after the filing of the appeal to the Federal Circuit. 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.145(c)(3) (1993).
The primary advantage of an appeal to a district court is that a party may submit any
additional evidence it feels necessary, whereas an appellant before the Federal Circuit is
limited to the record before the Board. See generally Squirtco v Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d
1038 (Fed. Cir. 1983). On the varying standards of appellate review applied by district
courts in reviewing actions by the Board, compare Aloe Creme Lab., Inc. v Texas
Pharmacal Co., 335 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir. 1964) ("In trademark cases 'a finding of fact
by the Patent Office as to confusing similarity of marks must be accepted as
controlling, unless the contrary is established by evidence "which, m character and amount
cames thorough conviction."'") (quoting Esso Standard Oil Co. v Sun Oil Co., 229 F.2d
37, 40 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting Morgan v Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 125 (1894)), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 973 (1956)) with Wells Fargo & Co. v. Stagecoach Properties, Inc., 685 F.2d 302
(9th Cir. 1982) (Board's decision to be accorded "substantial weight" by reviewing district
court but can be overcome by persuasive evidence).
101. See, e.g., Aloe Creme Lab. v Estee Lauder, Inc., 533 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1976)
(per curiam).
102. Section 32 of the Lanham Act creates a cause of action on behalf of the owner of
a federally registered trademark, service mark, collective mark, certification mark, or trade
dress against anyone who, without consent, uses in interstate commerce a "reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation" of the registered mark or trade dress. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In the absence of a federal registration, mark owners
seeking to proceed under federal law may rely upon § 43(a) of the Act, which allows the
owners of registered or unregistered marks or trade dresses to bring infringement actions
against defendants using "false designation[s] of origin." See id. § 1125(a).
103. See id. §§ 1057, 1072 (1988).
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parties or the amount in dispute.i04 Registrants also may employ the
resources of the United States Customs Service to exclude at the border
goods bearing infringing copies of their designations. 1 5 Perhaps the most
significant-and most controversial-of the advantages adhering to a regis-
tration on the Principal Register, however, are those of "incontestability "
The Lanham Act contemplates two types of "incontestability " The first
of these, and the only one expressly designated as such by the Act, is that
created by the interplay of sections 15 and 33 of the Act."° As between
unregistered users of two confusingly similar designations of origin, the
plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating superior rights to its mark or
trade dress in an infringement suit.1° Under section 33(a), and in contrast
to the limited evidentiary presumptions attaching to registration under the
Lanham Act's predecessors, 10  "[a]ny registration owned by a party to
an action shall be admissible in evidence and shall be prima facie evidence
of the validity of the registered mark m commerce on or in connection
with the goods or services specified in the regitraton." 119 In an infringe-
ment suit, registration thus shifts the burden of proof on the issues of validity
and ownership to the defendant,' 10 who must then introduce evidence
sufficient to rebut these presumptions."' As one court has explained:
104. See id. § 1121(a).
105. Id. §§ 1124, 1125(b); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115 (1988).
107 See, e.g., National Conference of Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc.,
692 F.2d 478, 488 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983).
108. The 1905 Act, for example, did not address the validity of marks underlying
registrations issued under that statute and provided only that "the registration of a trade-
mark under the provisions of this Act shall be prima facie evidence of ownership." 1905
Act § 16, 33 Stat. 724, 728. Thus, this provision did little to create rights where none had
been before. See United Drug Co. v Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 99 (1918).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1988); see also id. § 1057(b) ("A certificate of registration
of a mark upon the principal register provided by this [Act] shall be prima facie evidence
of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant's
ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in
commerce ").
110. See, e.g., Keebler Co. v Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 373 (1st Cir.
1980); Cot Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v Coit Drapery Cleaners of N.Y., Inc., 423 F Supp.
975, 978 (E.D.N.Y 1976); see also Wynn Oil Co. v Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1190 (6th
Cir. 1988).
111. Obviously, as with all presumptions, the statutory shift in the burden of proof on
these issues can be overcome by an appropriate showing by the defendant. See, e.g., Vision
Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 119-20 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016
(1980). Nevertheless, as the Second Circuit has noted, the prima. facie evidentiary status
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Under [section 33(a) of] the Act, registration is prima facie evidence of
the registrant's ownerslup of the mark and of the registrant's exclusive
right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the [goods or]
services specified in the registration certificate. Thus registration is
sufficient to establish prima facie (1) the required prior use (2) of a
registrable mark (3) which is likely to be confused with another's use of
the same or a similar mark.112
Subsequent to the fifth aniversary of a registration's issuance, section
15 of the Act allows the owner to file with the PTO an affidavit averring that
the underlying mark or trade dress has been in continuous and exclusive use
since its registration and that there has been no final decision adverse to the
registrant's ownership of the designation. "I Upon the PTO's acceptance of
the "section 15 affidavit, "ii4 "the right of the registrant to use [its] registered
mark in commerce for the goods or services on or in connection with which
such registered mark has been in continuous use for five consecutive years
subsequent to the date of such registration shall be incontestable." '5
Once the registrant's "exclusive right to use" its mark or trade dress has
become incontestable within the meaning of section 15, section 33(b) of the
Act In turn provides that "the registration shall be conclusive evidence of the
validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the
registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to
of a registration "means 'not only that the burden of going forward is upon the contestant
of the registration but that there is a strong presumption of validity so that the party claiming
invalidity has the burden of proof [and] must put something more into the scales than the
registrant.'" Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 14 (2d Cir.
1976) (alteration m original) (quoting Aluminum Fabricating Co. v Season-All Window
Corp., 259 F.2d 314, 316 (2d Cir. 1958)).
112. American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 10 (5th
Cir. 1974) (citation omitted).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1988); see also 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.167-.168 (1993).
114. The standards for the PTO's acceptance of the affidavit are not particularly strict:
The Office neither examines the merits of affidavits under § 15 nor
"accepts" affidavits under § 15. Ifa § 15 affidavit is filed at the proper time for
an eligible registration, the Office places it in the file without regard to its
substantive sufficiency and notifies the registrant that the affidavit has been
placed m the file.
UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK
MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1604, at 1600-10 to 1600-11 (2d ed. 1993)
[hereinafter T.M.E.P.].
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1988).
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use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the
goods and services specified m the [registration.]""' 6
Prior to 1985, the relationship between sections 15 and 33 was the
subject of considerable debate among the circuits. The Seventh Circuit, for
example, held that the owner of a descriptive mark whose registration had
become "incontestable" under section 15 enjoyed a conclusive presumption
of secondary meaning and therefore need not allege distinctiveness as part
of its prima facie case." 7 The Ninth Circuit, however, adopted the contrary
rule, holding that a registrant on these facts would enjoy the right to an
injunction only if it could demonstrate, separately and independently of its
registration, that its mark had achieved secondary meaning."'
The Supreme Court resolved this conflict in 1985 in Park 'N Fly, Inc.
v Dollar Park and Fly, Inc.," 9 in which it adopted the Seventh Circuit's
interpretation of sections 15 and 33."" Rejecting the respondent's claims
that the petitioner's registration could not be used in an offensive capacity,
the Park 'N Fly Court held that "[w]ith respect to incontestable marks,
§ 33(b) provides that registration is conclusive evidence of the registrant's
exclusive right to use the mark, subject to the conditions of § 15 and the
defenses enumerated in § 33(b) itself."'' Noting that "[miere
descriptiveness is not recognized [by the Act] as a basis for challenging an
incontestable mark,"' " the Court concluded that a "[d]efendant faced with
an mcontestabl[y] registered mark cannot defend [itself] by claiming that the
mark is invalid because it i descriptive."" Park 'N Fly thus arguably
precludes extratextual defenses to the evidentiary presumptions attaching to
a federal registration. 124
116. Id. § 1115(b) (emphasis added).
117 See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 377 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
118. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 718 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir.
1983), rev'd, 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
119. 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
120. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 196 (1985).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 205 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Union Carbide
Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 377 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830
(1976)).
124. For representative holdings with similar effect prior to Park 'N Fly, see, e.g.,
United States Jaycees v Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 143 (3d Cir. 1981); John R.
Thompson Co. v Holloway, 366 F.2d 108, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1966); see also American
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Under tins reading of section 15 incontestability, section 33's
presumptions are subject only to certain narrowly drawn exceptions set
forth in section 33(b)(1)-(8),1 s including but not limited to the Act's
codification of the common-law "fair use" defense applicable to descriptive
marks generally 11 Significantly, however, judicial interpretations of this
provision have held that "[tihe 'fair use' defense does not encompass use
Express v. American Express Limousine Serv., Ltd., 772 F Supp. 729, 732 (E.D.N.Y
1991).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(i)-(8) (1988).
126. Codifying the common-law "fair use" defense, see supra notes 24-26 and
accompanying text, § 33(b)(4) establishes the defense:
That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a
use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his own
business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of
a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only
to describe the goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin.
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1988). Aside from the fair use defense of § 33(b)(4), the other
defenses to the incontestable evidentiary presumptions created by § 33 include:
(1) That the registration or the incontestable right to use the mark was obtained
fraudulently; or
(2) That the mark has been abandoned by the registrant; or
(3) That the registered mark is being used by or with the permission of the
registrant or a person in pnvity with the registrant, so as to misrepresent the
source of the goods and services on or in connection with which the mark
is used; or
(5) That the mark whose use by a party is charged as an infringement was
adopted without knowledge of the registrant's prior use and has been
continuously used by such party or those in privity with him from a date
prior to the date of constructive use of the mark Provided,
however, That this defense or defect shall apply only for the area in which
such continuous prior use is proved; or
(6) That the mark whose use is charged as an infringement was registered and
used prior to the registration under this [Act] or publication under subsection
(c) of section 1062 of this title of the registered mark of the registrant, and
not abandoned: Provided, however, That this defense or defect shall
apply only for the area in which the mark was used prior to such registra-
tion , or
(7) That the mark has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws of the
United States; or
(8) That equitable principles, including laches, estoppel, and acquiescence, are
applicable.
Id. § 1115(b)(1)-(8).
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that will lead to consumer confusion as to the source or origin of the goods
at issue."'27 Thus, "[i]t would be somewhat anomalous to hold that the
confusing use of another's trademark is 'fair use."'1'
Separate and independent of the concept of incontestability under
sections 15 and 33 of the Act are the provisions of section 14,129 which
sharply limit the circumstances under which a petitioner for cancellation
may proceed against a registration that is more than five years old.
Specifically, section 14(3)130 on its face provides that the validity of a
registration that has passed its fifth-year anniversary may be contested:
[I]f the registered mark becomes the generic name for the goods or
services, or a portion thereof, for which it is registered, or has been
abandoned, or its registration was obtained fraudulently or contrary to
the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of section [2] for a
registration under this chapter, or contrary to similar prohibitory
provisions of such prior Acts for a registration under such Acts, or if the
registered mark is being used by, or with the pernmssion of, the
registrant so as to misrepresent the source of the goods or services on
or m connection with which the mark is used.'3 '
In contrast to the language of sections 15 and 33, section 14 is a
defensive measure addressing the validity of the registration itselfy and not
127 Cullman Ventures, Inc. v Columbian Art Works, Inc., 717 F Supp. 96, 134
(S.D.N.Y 1989).
128. Schering Corp. v Schering Aktiengesellschaft, 667 F Supp. 175, 189 (D.N.J.
1987) (quoting Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
206 n.9 (2d Cir. 1979)), remanded without op., 870 F.2d 652 (3d Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 709 F Supp. 529 (D.N.J. 1988); see also Cullman Ventures, 717 F Supp. at 134
("The primary purpose of the trademark laws is to protect the public from confusion; hence,
the confusing use of another's trademark is not within the purview of the 'fair use'
defense.").
129 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1988).
130. Pursuant to the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102
Stat. 3935 [hereinafter TLRA], the original "section 14(c)" of the Act was redesignated
"section 14(3)." In light of this change-the reasons for which are unclear-this Article's
use of "section 14(3)" collectively refers to the subsection's pre-TLRA incarnation
(originally "section 14(c)") and to its current formulation.
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1988). Although an examination of these provisions is
beyond the scope of this article, § 14 provides certain additional grounds for the cancellation
of registrations of certification marks. See id. § 1064(5).
132. See Wallpaper Mfrs., Ltd. v. Crown Wallcovering Corp., 680 F.2d 755, 761 n.6
(C.C.P.A. 1982). The leading architect of the Lanham Act explained the rationale for this
form of incontestability as follows:
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the validity of its evidentiary significance as an offensive weapon in
infringement litigation.' For this reason, and notwithstanding frequent
confusion on this point," the existence of section 14 incontestability is not
dependent on, and is unrelated to, incontestability under section 15.135
Thus, "a registration that is over five years old may be cancelled solely on
the grounds set forth in Section 14[(3)], irrespective of whether or not the
owner of the registration has filed an affidavit under Section 15. "1
As the exceptions to the incontestability of registrations under section
14 suggest, the owner of a federal registration over five years old is largely
Of course the purpose of this incontestable business is to clean house. The
existing law is that a trade-mark of the registrant may be canceled at any time,
and the courts interpret "at any time" to mean just that. The result is that old
marks that have been registered under the act of 1881 and that have been
renewed from time to time are always subject to cancell]ation, which tends to
a feeling of insecurity in trade-mark property
Then there is the second [reason], that small users frequently are out
to get what they can. They will conserve a small use and wait and hide behind
the bush until a man who has spent a lot of money in a trade-mark begins to get
to the point where he cannot abandon it without enormous loss, and then our
small user hops out from behind the bush and barks and says[:] "All right, you
can have it if you pay me so much." And that is bad. Something ought to be
done to stop that kind of thing, and it seems to me, and it seemed to the
committee last year, that after a mark had been on the register for 5 years,
and registration being made notice, if anyone had any objection he ought to
come in with it in 5 years and state his objection, and if he does not do it, he
ought to be foreclosed.
Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-marks of the House Comm. on
Patents, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 106-07 (1939) (statement of Edward S. Rogers) microformed
on Sup. Docs. No. Y 4.P27/1:T67/23 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office); see also Hearings on
H.R. 82 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 21
(1944) microformed on Sup. Docs. No. Y 4.P27/2:T67/4 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office).
133. Likewise, and notwithstanding occasional judicial confusion on this point, see,
e.g., Money Store v Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 1982),
incontestability of the registration of the mark does not translate into incontestability of the
mark itself.
134. See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 13 (2d
Cir. 1975) (noting, in context of defendant's counterclaim for cancellation, that plaintiffs
registrations "appear to have become incontestable by virtue of the filing of affidavits under
§15(3)").
135. See Imperial Tobacco, Ltd. v. Philip Morrs, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575, 1579 n.5 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
136. Western Worldwide Enters. Group Inc. v Qinqdao Brewery, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1137, 1139 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
1283
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1257 (1994)
in a position to control its own destiny Assuming that its mark or trade
dress was not registered m violation of the content-based subsections (a)-(c)
of section 2 of the Act,13 7 a federal registrant conceivably can renew its
registration at ten-year intervals as long as the designation remains in use.'
Thus, incontestability within the meaning of section 14 effectively grants a
limited statutory monopoly to a registrant otherwise able to avoid the
pitfalls of section 14.139
IV The Shakespeare Litigation
A. The Opinions
It was against the backdrop of the competing conceptions of incontest-
ability represented by sections 14 and 15 of the Lanham Act that the
plaintiff's appeal reached the Fourth Circuit in Shakespeare Co. v Silstar
Corp. of America.4 The subject of the litigation in Shakespeare was the
plaintiff's "immensely successful" line of UGLY STIK brand fishing
rods.14 1 In contrast to most competing models, the majority of rods making
up the plaintiff's UGLY STIK line featured a clear translucent tip attached
to a darker body As described by the Fourth Circuit, "[t his composition
represented the culnunation of a series of techniques developed by
Shakespeare and it resulted in a superior rod that is both lightweight and
very strong."'4 On May 5, 1978, Shakespeare applied to register the trade
137 For the text of these provisions, see supra note 80.
138. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.181-.184 (1993).
139. As the Board has explained:
This balancing of property rights and public interest seems to us to have
resulted m a statutory scheme whereby, once a trademark owner has had a
registration for five years, his property interests come to the fore, and his
registration will thenceforth be safe from attack unless he makes the registration
vulnerable through his own actions, or unless he was never entitled to the
registration to begin with. For example, if the registrant fails to perform actions
which are within his control, e.g., he abandons his mark or uses his mark so as
to misrepresent the source of the goods or allows the mark to become, or
promotes it as, the generic name for the goods, his registration can be canceled
because he has, m effect, participated in its destruction.
Consorzio del Proscuitto di Parma v Parma Sausage Prods. Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1894, 1899 (T.T.A.B. 1992).
140. 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
141. Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 9 F.3d 1091, 1092 (4th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
142. Id.
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dress of its UGLY STIK design with the PTO and described the subject of
its application as follows:
The mark is used by applying it to the goods in that the mark is the
color configuration of the fishing rod as shown m the drawing m which
the tip portion of the shaft between the tip and the second line guide
elements consists of a whitish, translucent material in contrast to the
opaque remainder of the shaft. 43
In processing Shakespeare's application, the PTO Examining Attorney
did not make an ex parte inquiry into the possible functionality of the
UGLY STIK design, but instead objected to the application on the ground
that the "mark appears to be in the nature of an ornamental design and, as
such, does not serve the purpose of indicating origin of the goods in
[Shakespeare]. 'l " On Shakespeare's request for reconsideration, the
Examining Attorney accepted the company's evidence of secondary
meaning and allowed issuance of a registration on the Principal Register
covering the design on December 20, 1983. Shakespeare later filed a
section 15 affidavit, and the registration became incontestable under that
statute on November 13, 1989 145
Subsequent to that time, Silstar Corporation, with full knowledge of
Shakespeare's claimed rights in the design," introduced under the
SILSTAR POWER TIP CRYSTAL mark a line of fishing rods that
"featured a color combination, with a clear fiberglass section, similar to that
of the Shakespeare clear-tip line." 47 Other than the color combination, the
Silstar design apparently was readily distinguishable from Shakespeare's
UGLY STIK rods. 4' In response, Shakespeare filed suit in the District
143. Id. at 1092-93.
144. Id. at 1093.
145. Id., see supra notes 113-16 (discussing procedure for § 15 incontestability).
146. Shakespeare Co. v Silstar Corp. of Am., 802 F Supp. 1386, 1393 (D.S.C.
1992), rev'd, 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
147 Shakespeare, 9 F.3d at 1093.
148. As the district court noted:
Other than the similarity between the color configurations of the rod base
and tip, the [Silstar] and [Shakespeare] rods differ significantly in appearance.
For example, Shakespeare uses silver colored line guides, a silver colored
extreme tip portion, and red and yellow diamond wrap at the base of the rod
above the handle. In contrast, Silstar uses gold colored line guides, a gold
colored extreme tip portion, and no wrap at the base of the rod. Moreover, the
handles differ significantly in shape (cylindrical vs. tapered) and the reel sets
differ m color (black vs. gold). Finally, Shakespeare places its Ugly Stik logo
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Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging that Silstar's confusingly
similar composite rod design constituted federal and common-law trademark
infringement and unfair competition. 49 Simultaneously with its complaint,
Shakespeare applied for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
mjunction.50 Although finding the former application moot, the district
judge initially assigned to the case entered a preliminary injunction against
further distribution of the Silstar rods.'
Silstar fared considerably better upon reassignment of the case to
another judge and after a full trial on the merits. First, although acknowl-
edging that the incontestable status of the evidentiary presumptions attaching
to Shakespeare's registration placed the burden on Silstar of demonstrating
one of the applicable defenses under section 15,152 the district court found
that Silstar's design constituted a "fair use" of the clear tip within the
meaning of section 33(b)(4)," in that the color combination commuicated
the "positive characteristics" of a "graphite base with a solid fiberglass tip"
in prominent, white letters on its rods, while Silstar's lower tip Crystal logo
appears in gold letters with a red background.
Shakespeare, 802 F Supp. at 1392-93.
149. As Justice Stevens has explained:
[Tihe test for liability [for trademark infringement] is likelihood of confusion:
"'Uinder the Lanham Act , the ultimate test is whether the public is likely
to be deceived or confused by the similarity of the marks. Whether we call
the violftion infringement, unfair competition or false designation of origin, the
test is identical-is there a "likelihood of confusion?"
Two Pesos, Inc. v Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2763 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (footnote omitted) (quoting New West Corp. v NYM Co. of Cal., 595 F.2d
1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1979)). To determine whether confusion is likely, courts in the Fourth
Circuit consider the factors set forth in Pizzeria Uno Corp. v Temple, 747 F.2d 1522 (4th
Cir. 1984), which include: (1) the strength of the plaintiff's mark; (2) the similarity of the
parties' marks; (3) the similarity of the parties' goods and services; (4) the similarity of the
parties' trade outlets and channels of distribution; (5) the similarity of the parties'
advertising; (6) the defendant's intent in adopting its mark; and (7) any evidence of actual
confusion as to whether the defendant's goods or services are produced, sponsored,
certified, or approved by the plaintiff. See id. at 1527 These factors are also generally
applicable to determine infringement and unfair competition under South Carolina law. See,
e.g., Taylor v Hoppm' Johns, Inc., 405 S.E.2d 410, 413 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991).
150. .Shakespeare, 9 F.3d at 1093.
151. Id.
152. Shakespeare, 802 F Supp. at 1395.
153. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
1286
FEDERAL REGISTRATION OF FUNCIIONAL DESIGNS
and that Silstar had used the design m good faith." 4 Thus, the district court
concluded, Silstar was "entitled to prevail on Shakespeare's federal
trademark infringement claim and it may use the mark on its rods."'55
Going beyond tls conclusion, however, the district court further held
that Silstar's eligibility for the fair use exception to the evidentiary
presumptions of sections 15 and 33 applied with equal force to destroy the
incontestability of the registration itself under section 14. Although
correctly noting that "because Silstar has proven its fair use defense, the
registration now has the same evidentiary value that it had during the five-
year period of continuous use preceding the point m time in which it
became incontestable, "'56 the district court erroneously concluded that "the
fair use defense has destroyed the incontestable status of the registration."
Compounding its failure to recognize that section 14 incontestability is not
dependent on its section 15 counterpart, 58 the district court held that the
latter statute did not protect Shakespeare's registration against cancellation
on the ground that its UGLY STIK design was functional. 59
On Shakespeare's appeal to the Fourth Circuit, however, the appellate
court reversed."W The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by addressing the
distinction between administrative cancellations of registrations by the
154. Shakespeare, 802 F Supp. at 1396.
155. Id. at 1396-97 (footnote omitted).
156. Id. at 1397 (emphasis added).
157 Id. (emphasis added).
158. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
159. The underlying functionality of the design does not appear to have been a seriously
disputed issue between the parties. As the district court noted:
[T]here is no alternative design to Shakespeare's mark which would be as
effective in communicating to consumers the fact that the rod is made of a
graphite base and a solid fiberglass tip since the clear tip and the opaque base
represent the natural colors of the graphite and fiberglass resin which compose
the rod. To allow Shakespeare to have a perpetual monopoly on the color
configuration would unquestionably hinder competition since it would preclude
all competitors from using the most natural and most effective means of
marketing their products, and would require then to use a less effective and
more costly method. This hindrance to competition would ultimately result m
a detriment to consumers.
Shakespeare, 802 F Supp. at 1398 (footnote omitted). On the functionality of fishing rod
coloration generally, see also R.L. Winston Rod Co. v. Sage Mfg. Co., 838 F Supp. 1396,
1400 (D. Mont. 1993) (holding that manufacturing process restricts producers to "a few dark
shades").
160. Shakespeare, 9 F.3d at 1091.
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Board under section 14 and the authority under section 37 of the Act for
courts "[to] determne the right to registration, order the cancellation of
registrations, in whole or m part, and otherwise rectify the register
with respect to the registrations of any party to [an] action. "161 Noting that
section 37 did not contain any express restrictions on judicial cancellation
power, the Fourth Circuit framed the disposition of the case as turning on
"whether [a] district court's authority to cancel under [section 37] is
circumscribed by the same limitations that restrain the Board in an
administrative cancel[1]ation proceeding."162
Although acknowledging that "the central issue m Park 'N' Fly [sic]
differs from that of the case at bar,"'6 the court nevertheless held the
Supreme Court's decision in that case to mandate an affirmative answer to
this question. Finding persuasive Park 'N Fly's holding that district courts
could not depart from the express texts of sections 15 and 33 when
determining whether a particular mark is distinctive, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that "[i]f the power of the district court under [section 37] is
implicitly constrained by the specific provisions of one subsection of the
Lanham Act, [section 33(b)], it is reasonable to conclude that it is limited
by another related subsection, [section 14]." '164 As the court further
explained:
We are persuaded that the rationale enunciated by Justice O'Connor
m Park 'N' Fly [sic] would apply so as to limit cancellation to the
grounds set forth m [section 14]. Functionality is not one of such
grounds and it may not be used as a basis for cancellation of a
registration more than five years old.' 65
The appellate court therefore reversed and remanded the case to the district
court with the additional instruction that "any inquiry into an alleged 'fair
use' of the clear tip must be accompanied by an analysis of the likelihood
of confusion among consumers that may be created by Silstar's use of the
clear tip. "166
One member of the Fourth Circuit panel dissented." First, the dissent
objected to the majority's conclusion that the evidentiary presumptions of
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (1988).
162. Shakespeare, 9 F.3d at 1096.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1097
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1099.
167 See id. at 1099-1106 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
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sections 15 and 33 could apply to a functional design. As the dissent noted,
"[e]ven if every presumption is made in favor of the existence of a
trademark-that the mark enables deterrmnation of source, that it distin-
guishes the relevant goods, and that it has secondary meaning-these factors
will not allow a functional feature to be monopolized."16 Thus, in the
dissent's judgment, "[e]ven if the registration is allowed to stand, that does
not preclude us from denying enforcement of a mark when such enforce-
ment would be repugnant to the policies embodied in this nation's laws."169
Second, although noting that "[w]hether this court should order
cancellation of the plaintiff's trademark [registration] on the grounds of
functionality is a secondary, not a dispositive, question," 70 the dissent
argued that cancellation was in order. Distinguishing cases cited by the
majority for the proposition that judicial cancellation authority was
concurrent with that of the PTO, the dissent asserted that "[t]his may well
be true as a general matter, but the present case involves a claim that the
office has attempted an act beyond its power and undertaken actions
repugnant to federal policy " Invoking no less an authority than Marbury
v Madison," the dissent would have held that the federal courts are able
to assess the registrability of marks independently of any admnistrative
restrictions contained in the Lanham Act. 73
B. "Incontestable" Registrations of Functional Configurations:
A Critique
In upholding Shakespeare's federal trade dress registration of an
apparently functional design, the Fourth Circuit committed two errors, one
statutory and the other constitutional. First, by confusing the differing
concepts of incontestability under sections 14 and 15, the court assumed
without serious consideration that Park 'N Fly governed its disposition of
the case. In contrast to the facts in Shakespeare, however, Park 'N Fly
dealt with only the scope of the incontestable evidentiary presumptions
attaching to the registration at issue and not, as the Fourth Circuit
apparently believed, with the validity of the registration itself. Specifically,
168. Id. at 1099.
169. Id. at 1106.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
173. Shakespeare, 9 F.3d at 1106 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
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although the defendant in Park 'N Fly originally sought the cancellation of
the plaintiff's registration,'74 the pleadings before the Supreme Court in that
case focused on whether the plaintiff was excused from its burden of
proving secondary meaning through the operation of sections 15 and 33.
Park 'N Fly's holding that the plaintiff s registration m that case was
entitled to a "conclusive" evidentiary presumption on that issue presupposed
the validity of the registration itself,75 a question not directly presented to
the Court by the procedural disposition of the case. 76
The distinction between incontestability under sections 14 and 15 is
more than an academic one. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Park
'N Fly, the Ninth Circuit stood alone in recogmzing the extrastatutory
defense of descriptiveness to the operation of sections 15 and 33.1 In
overturning this holding, therefore, the Court adopted an approach
consistent with all other jurisdictions to address the subject. 7 ' Of perhaps
equal importance, and as the Park 'N Fly Court correctly noted,179 the
express intent of the Seventy-ninth Congress to target descriptiveness in
particular for exclusion from the list of permissible defenses to sections 15
and 33 is amply reflected m the legislative history of the Act."W
174. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 718 F.2d 327, 330-31 (9th Cir.
1983), rev'd, 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
175. See Suman Naresh, Incontestability and Rights in Descriptive Trademarks, 53 U.
CHI. L. REv 953, 976 (1986) ("No incontestable right to use [under § 15] arises if the
registration is cancellable [under § 14] ").
176. See Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198 n.5.
177 The only other jurisdiction to adopt the position that descriptiveness could serve
as a defense to §§ 15 and 33, the Seventh Circuit, had abandoned it prior to the filing of the
complaint m Park N Fly. See John Morrell & Co. v Reliable Packing Co., 295 F.2d 314,
316 (7th Cir. 1961), overruled by Union Carbide Corp. v Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366,
373, 377 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
178. See, e.g., United States Jaycees v Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 137 (3d
Cir. 1981); Soweco, Inc. v Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v Hunting World Inc., 537 F.2d
4, 12 (2d Cir. 1976); Union Carbide, 531 F.2d at 377; Ansul Co. v Malter Int'l Corp., 199
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 596, 599-600 (T.T.A.B. 1978).
179. See Park N Fly, 469 U.S. at 197-202.
180. On this point, if m no other respect, the issue presented in Shakespeare differs
dramatically from that in Park 'N Fly, as the potentially incontestable status of registrations
covering descriptive marks was hotly debated, and subsequently and repeatedly ratified, in
proceedings leading to the passage of the Lanham Act. See, e.g., H.R. CoNP REP No.
2322, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1946) (declining to recognize descriptiveness as defense to
§ 15); Hearings on S. 895 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 77th
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Nevertheless, even if Park 'N Fly is characterized as barring all
nontextual defenses to sections 15 and 33,1 as opposed to the descriptive-
ness defense specifically, such a literal approach has not been characteristic
of interpretations of section 14.11 Rather, courts historically have
recogmzed that, under certain circumstances, registrations may be void
whether or not the Act's relatively liberal registrability provisions"ir
Cong., 2d Sess. 45-47 (1942) (rejecting inclusion of descriptiveness as defense m
infringement action to protect incontestably registered mark), microformed on Sup. Docs.
No. Y 4.P27/2:T67/3 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office); see also Hearings on H.R. 82 Before
the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 59-60 (1944)
(reflecting debate over wisdom of allowing registration of descriptive mark to become
incontestable), microformed on Sup. Docs. No. Y 4.P27/2:T67/4 (U.S. Gov't Printing
Office); Hearings on H.R. 102, Subcomm. on Trade-marks of the House Comm. on Patents,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. 106-07, 109-11, 175 (1941) (same), microformed on Sup. Docs. No.
Y 4.P27/1.T67/24 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office).
181. Perhaps significantly, a number of cases subsequent to Park 'N Fly expressly
rejected this interpretation of §§ 15 and 33 by allowing defendants to assert the equitable,
but extrastatutory, defenses of laches and acquiescence. See, e.g., United States Jaycees v
Cedar Rapids Jaycees, 794 F.2d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that literal application
of § 33 would "wipe away the discretion which is inherent in the [court's] equitable
power"); see also Pyrodyne Corp. v. Pyrotronics Corp., 847 F.2d 1398, 1402-03 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 968 (1988); Citibank, N.A. v Citytrust, 644 F Supp. 1011, 1013
(E.D.N.Y 1986). But see Montgomery Ward & Co. v Ward's Home Prods., 6
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2053, 2055 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("Were an infringer able to prevent
enforcement proceedings against it on equitable grounds, the registrant's right to use the
mark would cease to be exclusive. Congress has determined that incontestability begets
exclusivity, and we are not at liberty to expand the exceptions expounded m section
[33(b)]."). Congress legislatively ratified this approach in 1988 through the passage of the
Trademark Law Revision Act, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 128, 102 Stat. 3935, 3944-45
(1988), which amended § 33(b) to recognize equitable defenses to that provision. See 15
U.S.C. § 1115(b)(8) (1988).
182. For representative case law prior to Park WN Fly recognizing extrastatutory
exceptions to § 14, see Stanspec Co. v American Chain & Cable Co., 531 F.2d 563, 566
(C.C.P.A. 1976) (holding that when registration in question has been amended in manner
that enlarges registrant's rights, § 14's statute of limitations begins to run from date of
amendment, not date of registration, per statute's express text); Continental Gumm-Werke
AG v. Continental Seal Corp., 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 822, 824 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (same); see
also Willianison-Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Mann Overall Co., 359 F.2d 450, 453-55 (C.C.P.A.
1966) (allowing counterclaim for cancellation on grounds not expressly recognized by
§ 14(3) when registrant's filing of opposition occurred immediately prior to fifth anniversary
of issuance of registrant's registration, but counterclaim was filed afterwards); Sunbeam
Corp. v Duro Metal Prods. Co., 106 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385, 386 (Comm'r Pat. 1955)
(same).
183. See Morehouse Mfg. Corp. v. J. Strickland & Co., 407 F.2d 881, 888 (C.C.P.A.
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expressly authorize their cancellation. In Robt v Five Platters, Inc.,1  for
example, the Ninth Circuit upheld the cancellation of a registration on the
basis of the registrant's fraudulent section 15 affidavit,s notwithstanding the
fact that section 14 on its face contemplates cancellation only if the
registration itself, rather than section 15 incontestability, "was obtained
fraudulently " More to the point, in F.R. Lepage Bakery, Inc. v Roush
Bakery Products Co., the Federal Circuit upheld the cancellation of an
otherwise "incontestable" thirty-two year old registration on the ground that:
A basic principle pertaining to cancellation of registrations is that
they were obtained contrary to the statute. The same principle logically
applies (though the statute is silent on this point) if ownership is
transferred to one who has no right, or would have had no right to
obtain the registration."~
1969) ("It is m the public interest to mamntain registrations of technically good trademarks on
the register so long as they are still in use. The register then reflects commercial reality.").
184. 918 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1990).
185. Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 918 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1990). For a pre-Park
'NFy decision to a similar effect, see Crown Wallcovenng Corp. v. Wall Paper Mfrs., Ltd.,
188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 141, 142 (T.T.A.B. 1975).
186. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1988). The subject of fraudulent post-registration filings
is one on which courts are remarkably willing to disregard § 14's express text in favor of
extrastatutory exceptions to its five-year statute of limitations. Although the statute itself
allows for the cancellation "at any time" of only registrations that have been fraudulently
obtained, rather than fraudulently renewed or maintained, post-Park N Fly courts routinely
have concluded that virtually any type of fraud on the PTO is a ground for cancellation. See,
e.g., Torres v. Cantine Torresella S.r.l., 808 F.2d 46, 48 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (upholding
cancellation of fraudulently renewed, rather than fraudulently obtained, registration on ground
that "[firaud in obtaining renewal of a registration amounts to fraud in obtaining a registration
within the meaning of section [14(3)]"); General Car & Truck Leasing Sys. Inc. v. General
Rent-A-Car Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398, 1401 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding maintenance
of registration through fraudulent affidavit of use filed under § 8 of Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1058
(1988), to be ground for cancellation). Indeed, as the cancellation for a fraudulent § 15
affidavit in Robi demonstrates, courts are willing to reach this result even in cases in which
the fraudulent filing is not in any way necessary to the continued maintenance of the
registration on the PTO's registers:
Each eligible registrant has the option of whether or not to take advantage of
[§ 15]. A registrant may choose to claim the benefits of incontestability and file
an appropriate affidavit or may elect to retain the registration without those
benefits. The term of the registration, for the purpose of renewal, is not affected
in either event.
T.M.E.P., supra note 114, § 1604, at 1600-10.
187 851 F.2d 351 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 863 F.2d 43 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
188. F.R. Lepage Bakery, Inc. v. Roush Bakery Prods. Co., 851 F.2d 351, 354 (Fed.
1292
FEDERAL REGISTRATION OF FUNCTIONAL DESIGNS
Significantly, each decision issued after the Supreme Court's opimon in
Park 'N Fly, yet neither decision discussed that case.'19
That nontextual exceptions may exist under section 14 even if they are
unavailable under sections 15 and 33 does not, of course, resolve the
separate inquiry of whether functionality is a relevant consideration under
the former. On this issue, the Shakespeare court was correct that the
Lanham Act does not expressly recogmze functionality as a basis for the
cancellation of any registration, much less one that has passed its fifth
anmversary 11 Indeed, it is apparent that Congress did not give extended
thought to the registrability on the Principal Register of trade dresses at all
when drafting the Act. With the arguable exception of the statutory
definition of a "trademark,"' 9' which encompasses "any device" identifying
the owner's goods," the Act's registrability provisions speak in such terms
as "generic,"'9  "descriptive, "194  "geographically descriptive, '"" and
"primarily merely a surname,"'' all phrases uniquely suited for word
Cir.) (emphasis added), vacated, 863 F.2d 43 (Fed. Cir. 1988). For an expanded discussion
of F.R. Lepage Bakery, see infra notes 231-41 and accompanying text.
189. Although their examination is beyond the scope of this Article, other post-Park 'N
Fly decisions have recognized additional extrastatutory grounds for the cancellation of
registrations less than five years old. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v Jacobson Prods. Co., 13
F.3d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir.) (directing cancellation of registration covering allegedly
distinctive product color, notwithstanding court's observation that "[riegistration of mere
color is not exlicitly barred by the Lanham Act"), cert. granted, 63 U.S.L.W 3255 (1994);
Global Maschmen GmbH v Global Banking Sys., Inc., 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 862, 866-67
(T.T.A.B. 1985) (invoking, subsequent to Park N Fly, Paris Convention to cancel
registration on extrastatutory ground that registrant was domestic distributor for owner of
same mark in foreign country).
190. See Shakespeare, 9 F.3d at 1097-98; cf. In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d
496, 501 (C.C.P.A. 1961) ("[A]ppellant tells us that nowhere in the statute is a 'functional'
mark mentioned pro or con.").
191. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
192. See id. It was not until the late 1980s-well after the enactment of § 14, as well
as the issuance of the registration at issue in Shakespeare-that Congress evinced any
recognition whatsoever that this definition might sweep in product configurations. See S.
REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1988) (noting that definition of "trademark" under
Lanham Act is intentionally broad and uses "the words 'symbol or device' so as not to
preclude the registration of colors, shapes, sounds or configurations where they function as
trademarks").
193. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1988).
194. See, e.g., id. § 1052(e)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
195. See id. § 1052(e)(2).
196. See id. § 1052(e)(4).
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marks, but with little apparent applicability to nonverbal designations of
origin.
The Fourth Circuit failed to recognize in Shakespeare, however, that
common law principles for decades have been fully applicable to the federal
registration of trade dresses, whether or not those principles are expressly
set forth in the Lanham Act. It is true that, consistent with the lack of
congressional attention to trade dresses, the Patent Office initially was
reluctant to extend registration to containers and product configurations
under the Act."9 In part, this reluctance was the result of judicial hostility
towards the limited and sporadic issuance of such registrations under the
Act's predecessors. 198 Moreover, refusals by the Commissioner of Patents
to register containers and product configurations generally were upheld on
judicial review by enthusiastic courts, "9 including but not limited to the
Fourth Circuit itself. °
Beginning m the 1950s, however, the Patent Office began to allow the
registration of container shapes under the Act under the same standards as
those used to determine their eligibility for protection in common-law
infringement suits. In Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., for example, the
Commissioner reversed the Examiner of Trademarks' refusal to register the
configuration of the applicant's well-known "pinch bottle" and held the
bottle eligible for the Principal Register.' This apparent switch in the
197 See, e.g., Ex parte Alan Wood Steel Co., 101 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 209 (Examiner
m Chief 1954), aff'd sub nom. Alan Wood Steel Co. v Watson, 150 F Supp. 861 (D.D.C.
1957); Ex parte Boye Needle Co., 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (Examiner m Chief 1953).
198. See generally John A. Diaz & Warren H. Rotert, Principal Registration of
Contours of Packages and Containers Under the Trademark Act of 1946, 49 TRADEMARK
REP. 13, 16-18 (1959).
199. See, e.g., In re Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 69 F.2d 567 (C.C.P.A. 1934);
In re Dennison Mfg. Co., 39 F.2d 720 (C.C.P.A. 1930); Sheaffer Pen Co. v Coe, 27 F
Supp. 380 (D.D.C. 1939).
200. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v Robertson, 25 F.2d 833, 834-35 (4th Cir.
1928).
201. 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (Comm'r Pat. 1958).
202. As Assistant Commissioner of Patents Daphne Leeds explained:
Where the record shows that a container of distinctive appearance is adopted
for the purpose of identifying an applicant's brand of product and distinguishing
it from other brands, and there is no way of identifying or asking for such brand
of product other than by describing the contour or conformation of the
container, and both the trade and public, for many years, use the description of
the contour or conformation of the container in ordering the applicant's brand
of product, the contour or conformation of the container may be a trademark-a
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Patent Office's position on the subject soon led to applications for the
registration of other containers including, for example, one covering the
configuration of the contoured Coca-Cola bottle, a registration for which
issued in 1960.1
The newly recogmzed registrability of container trade dress initially
left open the question of whether similar treatment was available to product
configurations. Specifically, prevailing interpretations of the Act held that,
unlike word marks, such configurations were incapable of possessing
distinctiveness as indicators of origin. Prior to the decision in Haig, for
example, there was ample authority for the proposition that federal
registration could at most be extended to particular features of a product
and not its overall shape.3 Indeed, even Judge Giles Rich, who would
become the most notable jurist of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(C.C.P.A.) on the subject,' expressed doubts as to whether configurations
ever could serve as indicators of origin.3
Nevertheless, in 1964, the C.C.P.A. reversed a refusal to register the
shape of a triangular chemical cake in In re Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co.207 The court ordered the product's configuration entered on the
Supplemental Register for non-inherently distinctive marks lacking the
secondary meaning necessary to entitle them to registration on the Principal
Register. 8 The decision thereby recognized the possibility that the shape
could, at some later date, acquire secondary meaning and function as a
protectable-and fully registrable-mark.' Taking the lead of its
reviewing court in 1965, the Board in In re Superba Cravats, Inc.21° found
symbol or device-which distinguishes the applicant's goods, and it may be
registrable on the Principal Register.
Er parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229, 230-31 (Comm'r Pat. 1958).
203. See Julius R. Lunsford, Jr., The Protection of Packages and Contamers, 56
TRADEMARK REP. 567, 573 (1966).
204. See, e.g., Exparte Mars Signal-Light Co., 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 173 (Comm'r Pat.
1950).
205. See, e.g., In re R.M. Smith, Inc., 734 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Morton-
Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
206. See In re Mclhenny Co., 278 F.2d 953, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (Rich, J.,
concurring) ("Personally I doubt that goods in their entirety can be their own trademark."
(emphasis omitted)).
207 In re Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836, 840 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
208. Id., see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1095 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
209. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
210. 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 354 (T.T.A.B. 1965).
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the configuration of a hanger device for neckties inherently distinctive and
therefore eligible for registration on the Principal Register.211  These
decisions therefore established a two-tiered classification system equivalent
to that recognized under the common law of word marks: Registrable
configurations must be inherently distinctive (as are corned, arbitrary, and
suggestive word marks) or must have acquired distinctiveness (as is the case
with descriptive word marks that have achieved secondary meaning).
212
The incorporation of the common law into the doctrine governing the
registrability of product configurations did not work exclusively to the benefit
of designers, however, as the applicant in In re Deister Concentrator Co.
213
discovered to its disappointment. In 1957, Deister applied to register "a
substantially rhomboidal outline applied to the goods by configurating
the working surface thereof so that the exterior outline of such surface is
substantially rhomboidal in plan" as a trademark for "ore concentrating and
coal cleaning tables. "214 Reviewing a refusal of registration, the C.C.P.A.
noted that Deister's configuration was covered by two utility patents, upon
the expiration of which the company's competitors would be entitled to make
full use of the design under the patent laws. 215 The court also found relevant
industry references recogmzing that the rhombohedral shape of Deister's
tables offered substantial advantages by saving floor space and enhancing
processing speed.2 6 Indeed, even Deister's own advertising stressed the
apparent efficiency of the design.
217
On these facts, the court affirmed the refusal to register, not on the
basis of prohibitory language in the Lanham Act's registrability provisions,
but instead on the common law's well-established distaste for extending trade
dress protection to functional designs. Concluding that its functional nature
precluded Deister's design from acting as a trademark under any circum-
stances,2"' the court viewed this lack of cognizable ownership to be a fatal
211. In re Superba Cravats, Inc., 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 354, 355 (T.T.A.B. 1965).
212. See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1343 (C.C.P.A.
1982).
213. 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
214. In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 497 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
215. Id. at 498-99.
216. Id. at 504-05.
217 Id. at 504.
218. The Deister court observed:
It seems to us that this case perfectly exemplifies what we mean by a
functional or utilitarian shape which is incapable of acquiring a legally
recognizable "secondary meaning" or of becoming an enforceable trademark for
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deficiency in the application:
The fundamental distinction [the applicant] overlooks is that
between "functional" shapes that are never capable of being monopo-
lized, even when they become "distinctive of the applicant's goods,"
and shapes which can be monopolized because they are of such an
arbitrary nature that the law does not recognize a right in the public
to copy them, even if some incidental function is associated with
them.
219
Deister's recognition of a nonfunctionality requirement m the Act's
registrability provisions is significant in that it occurred in an appeal from a
refusal to register rather than in an action to cancel an already existing
registration. Section 2 of the Act, which defines categories of marks eligible
for registration, expressly excludes the possibility of extrastatutory grounds
for the rejection of applications to register particular marks.?0 Although, as
the Deister court correctly noted, functionality is not listed as a ground for
a reftsal to register,"' no tribunal to address the issue has held that
functional configurations are thereby eligible for registration. Rather, the
PTO, the Board, and courts alike routinely apply the extrastatutory doctrine
of nonfunctionality to reject applications to register these designs. m In light
of the far more permissive language of section 14, which provides only that
a five year old registration "may" be cancelled on certain grounds, without
expressly excluding others,' there is no readily apparent reason why
the simple reason that the public has the right to copy the shape and enjoy
its advantages. Under no circumstances can it be accorded the legal protection
to which trademarks are entitled. This being so, there is no need to consider the
extensive efforts made by the use of what [the applicant] calls advertising
"gmimicks" to turn this outline shape of the goods, per se, into a registrable
mark. It has attempted the impossible.
Id. at 505 (emphasis added).
219. Id. at 503.
220. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) ("No trade-mark by which the
goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused
registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless [one of the enumerated
exceptions applies]."); see also supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
221. See Detster, 289 F.2d at 501.
222. See, e.g., In re R.M. Smith, Inc., 734 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Best Lock
Corp. v Schlage Lock Co., 413 F.2d 1195 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Oscar Mayer & Co.,
189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 295 (T.T.A.B. 1975); In re Telesco Brophey Ltd., 170 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 427 (T.T.A.B. 1971).
223. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1988).
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functionality should be an appropriate nontextual consideration under one
of these provisions, but not the other.'
What is apparent, however, is that since Deister neither the C.C.P.A.
nor its successor court, the Federal Circuit,' has retreated from the
proposition that because a functional design is not properly registrable, a
mistakenly issued registration covering such a design is subject to
cancellation. 6 Indeed, the Federal Circuit in recent years increasingly has
applied a more stringent nonfunctionality standard to product configurations
such as that in Shakespeare. If an applicant's trade dress consists of the
packaging for its product, it may include both functional and nonfunctional
components,' and, under these circumstances, the PTO may consider the
trade dress as a whole.' The standard is different, however, if an
applicant claims protectable rights in the design of the product itself because
"before an overall product configuration can be recognized as a trademark
224. By the same token, nonfunctionality is not an express statutory prerequisite for a
successful trade dress infringement suit brought under § 43(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), to protect an unregistered design. Nevertheless, "[i]t is
clear that eligibility for protection under § 43(a) depends on nonfunctionality " Two
Pesos, Inc. v Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2758 (1992). Although, because it
owned a federal registration, the plaintiff in Shakespeare proceeded under § 32 of the Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), as well as § 43(a), "[i]t would be anomalous for
the imitation of a functional feature to constitute infringement for purposes of § 32,
while the same activity is not a 'false designation of origin' under § 43(a)." Inwood Lab.,
Inc. v Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 864 (1982) (White, J., concurring).
225. See supra note 99.
226. See, e.g., International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lmdeburg & Co., 727 F.2d
1087 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (ordering cancellation of registration less than five years old); Kasco
Corp. v Southern Saw Serv Inc., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (same);
see also Mechanical Plastics Corp. v Titan Technologies, Inc., 823 F Supp. 1137
(S.D.N.Y 1993).
227 See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1342 (C.C.P.A.
1982).
228. See In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 933 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (Rich,
J., concurring). This rule presupposes that the applicant is seeking to register the
appearance of its packaging as a trademark for the enclosed goods, rather than for the
configuration of the packaging itself. Although a "trademark right can be claimed for the
design for a glass container insofar as it has acquired distinctiveness by the use with
respect to particular goods, for instance, beverages or perfumes," designers of putatively
unique packaging often seek to protect their creations without regard to contents. See 2
STEPHEN P LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARK, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION § 489, at 843 (1975). In the event that this latter type of
protection is sought in the form of a trade dress registration, the Federal Circuit will apply
the standard described at infra note 229 and accompanying text.
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[in the Federal Circuit], the entire design must be arbitrary or non dejure
functional." 9 Thus, unlike the combination of descriptive words at issue
in Park 'N Fly, which conceivably could function as a mark (but arguably
did not do so), "[flunctional features cannot be trademarks."I
The Fourth Circuit's inability to recognize this point led to its failure
to realize that the relevant doctrinal framework for resolving the claims
before it was properly found in the Federal Circuit's decision in F.R.
Lepage Bakery, Inc. v Roush Bakery Products Co.," rather than the
majority opinion in Park 'N Fly In F.R. Lepage Bakery, the respondent
had acquired a three-decade old registration covering a collective mark from
an organization of which it was a member. 2 Because collective marks are
by definition properly owned only by organizations rather than individual
229. Textron, Inc. v United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019, 1025 (Fed.
Cir. 1985); accord Petersen Mfg. Co. v Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1550
(Fed. Cir. 1984). Outside the Federal Circuit, some jurisdictions have begun to apply this
distinction in fringement litigation involving unregistered trade dresses. See, e.g., Clamp
Mfg. Co. v Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 516 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872
(1989); Ohio Art Co. v Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 799 F Supp. 870, 884-85 (N.D. Ill.
1992); Tenax Corp. v Tensar Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1881, 1889 (D. Md. 1991).
Thus, under these cases, a plaintiff must prove that the particular features allegedly copied
by the defendant are nonfunctional. See, e.g., Gale Group Inc. v King City Indus. Co.,
23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1208, 1212 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
The rationale for the difference in treatment is readily apparent. Products that serve
a function, including such products as microwave ovens, food processors, and kitchen step
stools, will, almost by definition, look somewhat alike. See Litton Sys., Inc. v Whirlpool
Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Sunbeam Corp. v Equity Indus. Corp., 635
F Supp. 625, 635-37 (E.D. Va. 1986), aft'd, 811 F.2d 1505 (4th Cir. 1987); Black &
Decker Mfg. Co. v Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg. Co., 518 F Supp. 607, 617 (E.D. Mo.
1981), aff'd, 684 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1982). Under these circumstances, "the right to copy
better working [product] designs would, in due course, be stripped of all meaning if overall
functional designs were accorded trademark protection because they included a few arbitrary
and nonfunctional features." Textron, 753 F.2d at 1025.
230. Black & Decker, Inc. v. Hoover Serv. Ctr., 886 F.2d 1285, 1291 (Fed Cir. 1989)
(emphasis added) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). In other words, unlike a
descriptive mark that initially lacks secondary meaning, "[flunctionality trumps all
evidence of actual consumer identification of source and all evidence of actual consumer
confusion caused by an imitator. For 'functional' items, no amount of evidence of
secondary meaning or actual confusion will create a right to exclude." 1 McCARTHY, supra
note 51, § 7.26, at 7-110.
231. 851 F.2d 351 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 863 F.2d 43 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
232. F.R. Lepage Bakery, Inc. v Roush Bakery Prods. Co., 851 F.2d 351, 353-54
(Fed. Cir.), vacated, 863 F.2d 43 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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entities, 3 however, the Federal Circuit ordered the registration cancelled
"on the fundamental proposition that a collective mark registration cannot
be owned by one who would not be entitled to obtain it under the
statute. "'
That the F.R. Lepage Bakery court considered the unpossibility of the
designation at issue qualifying for collective mark status to be an implied
statutory ground for cancellation separate and independent from those
expressly set forth in the Act is apparent from the history of the case
below Considering the assignment of the mark from the collective
organization that had originally registered it, the Board had concluded that
the mark had been abandoned.'35 Although abandonment is an express
ground for cancellation of a registration that has passed its fifth anniversa-
ry, 1 6 the Federal Circuit nevertheless declined to rest its holding on this
finding.? Rather, because the assigned mark could not possibly qualify as
a collective mark, cancellation of the thirty-two year old registration
covering it was appropriate ' s even if such a cancellation was not expressly
contemplated by section 14.239
233. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
234. F.R. Lepage Bakery, 851 F.2d at 355.
235. See Roush Bakery Prods. Co. v. F.R. Lepage Bakery, Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1401 (T.T.A.B. 1987), af'd on other grounds, 851 F.2d 351 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 863 F.2d
43 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
236. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1988).
237 F.R. Lepage Bakery, 851 F.2d at 354-55.
238. The court concluded:
A collective mark is said to be a "trademark or service mark used by members
of a cooperative, an association or other group or organization." It follows
logically that only such an organization as is indicated by the statutory definition
can become the owner of a collective mark and as a corollary, only such an
organization, after acquiring ownership by use, can obtain a service mark
registration.
Id. at 354 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
239 See id. (acknowledging lack of express statutory authorization for cancellation).
Ultimately, the court vacated its original opinion when the respondent submitted evidence
that the registration had been reassigned to the original registrant, thereby bringing the
registration back into compliance with the Federal Circuit's (wholly extrastatutory)
requirement for continued maintenance on the Principal Register. See F.R. Lepage Bakery,
Inc. v. Roush Bakery Prods. Co., 863 F.2d 43 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Significantly, the court
did not mention § 14 m either its first opinion, which upheld cancellation of the registration
at issue, or its second opinion, which vacated the cancellation.
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F.R. Lepage Bakery strongly suggests that, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the availability of section 14's statute of limitations turns on
the extent to which a designation of origin underlying a registration is
eligible for common law protection. If, as in Park 'N Fly, the designation
at issue can conceivably function as a mark or trade dress under appropriate
circumstances, then section 14 properly operates to quiet the registrant's
title to that designation. If, however, as in F.R. Lepage Bakery, the
existence of rights to the putative "mark" underlying a registration is
impossible, then this fact will remove the registration from the protection
of this section of the Act. Under such an analysis, of course, the mipossi-
bility of functional features qualifying for trademark or trade dress status240
would prevent them from being the subject of a valid registration. 4
Shakespeare's contrary holding promises to have significant effects on
the competitive process. Under federal law, the patent statutes are the
intended vehicles for fostering innovation and progress.242 Rather than
encouraging the designer of a functional configuration to secure a utility
patent for its design, 243 however, Shakespeare creates incentives to seek
240. See Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v Eisemann Prods., 791 F.2d 423, 427 n.4 (5th Cir.
1986) ("[A] design cannot be found both legally functional-that is, not entitled to trademark
protection-and 'sufficiently distinctive' to serve as an indicator of source.").
241. See In re Pollak Steel Co., 314 F.2d 566, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1963) ("[Nlothmg which
the public has or would have a right to copy, in the absence of valid patent or copyright
protection, can be the subject of a valid trademark registration."); see also In re Bose Corp.,
215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1124, 1126 (T.T.A.B. 1982) ("A shape or configuration of an article
which is in its concept essentially or primarily utilitarian or functional cannot function as a
trademark under the Federal trademark statute, and cannot be registered either on the
Principal or Supplemental Register."), aff'd, 772 F.2d 866 (Fed. Cir. 1985). As the Board
noted m cancelling the respondent's registration m Kasco Corp. v Southern Saw Serv Inc.,
27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (T.T.A.B. 1993):
Having determined that [the registrant's] green wrapper is functional, [the
registrant] would not be entitled to maintain its registration even if it established
that the green wrapper had become distinctive of [the registrant's] saw blades
m that it now functioned as a trademark to identify [the registrant] as the source
of the blades.
Id. at 1505.
242. See, e.g., Kohler Co. v Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir. 1993); Stormy
Clime Ltd. v Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 977-78 (2d Cir. 1987).
243. Although this Article's focus is on the potential legal advantages of an
incontestably registered trade dress over a utility patent under the Shakespeare rule, it is
perhaps significant that the costs of securing a trademark registration typically are
substantially lower than those associated with the issuance of such a patent. For example,
the PTO's filing fee for an application to register a particular trade dress currently is
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possibly perpetual trademark protection instead.m Although, unlike a
utility patent, a federal trade dress registration covering a functional design
can be invalidated within five years of its issuance, 5 the fifth aniversary
of such a registration under the Shakespeare rule immediately would place
other participants in the registrant's industry at a significant competitive
disadvantage. 246
$210.00 per class of goods and services, the number of which for most product configura-
tions will likely be one. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.6(a)(1) (1993). In contrast, filing fees for
utility patent applications filed by applicants not qualifying for "small entity" status begin
at $710.00, with additional fees required depending on the number of "clauns" contained
in the application. See id. § 1.16. Because "patent law imposes a high standard for
patentable protection," Kohler, 12 F.3d at 643, this disparity increases dramatically when
the generally higher legal costs of preparing a utility patent application are taken into
account. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent
Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer-Related Inventions, 39 EMoRY L. J. 1025,
1137 n.40 (1990) ("Costs per patent application can exceed $10,000; even patent searches
to make sure one is not going to tread on someone else's patent, though less costly than
prosecuting patent applications, can be expensive and time-consummg and may require
professional patent counsel.").
244. As one court has explained in declining to overturn the Commissioner's refusal to
register a functional design:
Were the law otherwise, it would be possible for a manufacturer or dealer, who
is unable to secure a patent on his product or on his design, to obtain a
monopoly on an unpatentable device by registering it as a trade-mark. The
potential consequences to the public might be very serious, because while a
patent is issued for only a limited term, a trade-mark becomes the permanent
property of its owner and secures for him a monopoly m perpetuity
Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Watson, 150 F Supp. 861, 862 (D.D.C. 1957); see also Lon Tai
Slung Co. Ltd. v. Koch + Lowy, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1100 (S.D.N.Y 1990) ("If
a product is not patentable or if its patent has expired, the policy of promoting free
competition embodied in the patent laws suggests that the product should not be entitled to
protection from competitors and certainly should not receive protection in perpetuity, which
may be the effect of the invocation of trademark law.").
245. See, e.g., International Order of Job's Daughters v Lindeburg & Co., 727 F.2d
1087, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Kasco Corp. v Southern Saw Serv Inc., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1501, 1505 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
246. The unenviable position of a competitor of an owner of a registration covering a
functional configuration was perhaps best described by the C.C.P.A. in denying registration
to another Shakespeare design on functionality grounds:
Were the spiral marking to be treated as a trademark the holder of the trademark
rights would have a potentially perpetual monopoly which would enable it either
to prevent others from using the process which results in the mark or force them
to go to the trouble and expense of removing it.
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Likewise, Shakespeare creates corresponding disincentives for
designers to seek patent protection. Although other factors may come into
play, 247 the existence of a utility patent covering a design in which trade
dress significance is alleged is very strong, if not conclusive, evidence of
the functionality of the configuration.2' The reason for this rule is simple:
"Functional patent protection and trademark protection are mutually
exclusive."'249 Thus, when determining the eligibility of a product design
for trade dress protection, a "utility patent comprehending the configura-
tion in question is adequate evidence to establish that the configuration is
indeed functional in character."25 A prudent designer therefore would be
well advised to register its design under the Lanham Act, avoid filing a
utility patent application that would support a cancellation action, and then
quietly wait out section 14's five-year statute of limitations"' before
In re Shakespeare Co., 289 F.2d 506, 508 (C.C.P.A. 1961); see also In re Pollak Steel Co.,
314 F.2d 566, 570 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (denying registration to reflective coating of applicant's
product on ground that "[t]o permit appellant to assert trademark rights m its alleged mark
would clearly have the effect of unjustifiably giving appellant a perpetual monopoly on the
simplest and cheapest use of a simple process of applying a functional reflective coating to
a functionally designed metal fence post").
247 See, e.g., New England Butt Co. v International Trade Comm'n, 756 F.2d 874,
878 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding probative of functionality whether design owner has touted
utilitarian advantages of its product m its advertising, whether acceptable alternatives exist,
and whether design results from comparatively simple or inexpensive method of
manufacture).
248. See, e.g., In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 871 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Shenango
Ceramics, Inc., 362 F.2d 287, 291-92 (C.C.P.A. 1966); see also In re Oscar Mayer & Co.,
189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 295, 296 (T.T.A.B. 1975).
249. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 51, § 7.29, at 7-172.
250. In re Telesco Brophey Ltd., 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 427, 428 (T.T.A.B. 1971). As
Professor McCarthy has explained:
Although the courts treat functional patents as evidence of primary functionality,
this evidence is particularly entitled to great weight if the patent was applied for
by the same person who now asserts trademark significance m the same
configuration. [O]ne cannot argue that a shape is functionally advantageous
in order to obtain a utility patent and later assert that the same shape is non-
functional in order to obtain trademark protection.
I MCCARTHY, supra note 51, § 7.29, at 7-172.
251. Obviously, a plaintiff that for five years deliberately avoids litigation in which
a particular defendant might bring a cancellation counterclaim runs the risk of the
defendant later claiming that the plaintiff's claims are barred by laches, estoppel, or
acquiescence. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(8) (1988). These defenses, however, likely would
be available only to qualifying individual defendants and not to the industry as a whole.
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driving its competitors into the ground with trade dress infnngement
SUitS.2
See, e.g., Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Detroit Formng, Inc., 743 F.2d 1039, 1046-47 (4th
Cir. 1984).
252. If the parties to an infringement suit are making use of the most efficient designs
possible, with no nonutilitarian features, their configurations will, by definition, be
identical. Under these circumstances, there are two possible avenues for relief for a
registrant such as that in Shakespeare. First, at least one jurisdiction has held that a
registration that has become incontestable within the meaning of §§ 15 and 33 gives to the
registrant a private cause of action to protect its "exclusive right" to use the mark for the
goods recited in the registration. See Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d
659, 673-74 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989). Because this cause of action
provides an equitable remedy against any use of the "exact mark," see id. at 674, when
linked with the holding in Shakespeare, it apparently would give a trade dress registrant
a cause of action equivalent to that of a utility patent owner, who may proceed against any
manufacture, use, or sale of the product underlying its patent. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Second, even in jurisdictions not recognizing the cause of action described above,
see, e.g., Storck USA, L.P v Levy, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1965 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(rejecting independent § 33(b) cause of action), a registrant may proceed under the more
traditional causes of action created by §§ 32 and 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (1988
& Supp. V 1993), which mandate a demonstration that the defendant's use creates a
likelihood of confusion in the marketplace. See supra notes 6 & 149 (addressing
likelihood of confusion standard for liability). This requirement, however, is unlikely to
pose a significant burden in the purely functional product configuration context, in which,
as previously noted, both parties necessarily are using the same indicator of origin for
identical products. As the Sixth Circuit has observed, "[c]ases where a defendant uses an
identical mark on competitive goods hardly ever find their way into the appellate reports.
Such cases are 'open and shut' and do not involve protracted litigation to determine
liability." Wynn Oil Co. v Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1190 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting 2 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:3, at 56 (2d ed.
1984)); see also Reflange, Inc. v. R-Con Int'l, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1125, 1131
(T T.A.B. 1990) ("[C]onfusion between identical marks used for identical goods is
inevitable."). This is particularly true in the product configuration context, in which
disclaimers of affiliation are typically ineffective: "Display of the infringer's name is
least likely to avoid confusion when the infringement involves the design of the item itself
and not the package or the tradename." T&T Mfg. Co. v. A.T. Cross Co., 449 F Supp.
813, 822-23 (D.R.I.), aft'd, 587 F.2d 533 (1st. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908
(1979).
For this reason, although the Fourth Circuit's opinion arguably recognizes the
possibility of competitors qualifying for the statutory "fair use" defense afforded by 15
U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1988), its instruction that "any inquiry into an alleged 'fair use' of
the clear tip must be accompanied by an analysis of the likelihood of confusion among
consumers that may be created by Silstar's use of the clear tip," Shakespeare, 9 F.3d at
1099, renders that defense moot. Because the "fair use" defense does not encompass uses
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On one level, these results might be justified as a matter of strict
statutory construction. It is arguably true, for example, that the express
inclusion of certain grounds for cancellation in section 14 tacitly indicates
the exclusion of all others. 3 By the same token, "[t]here is a basic
difference between filling a gap left by Congress'[s] silence and rewriting
rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted. "I4 Thus,
if one assumes the potentially "faulty premise that all possible alternative
or supplemental provisions were necessarily considered and rejected by
[Congress]," 5 "[tihere is no more persuasive evidence of the purpose
of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give
expression to its wishes."I 6
Whatever the validity of the other judicially-created exceptions to
section 14,' the Fourth Circuit failed to recognize that there is a reason,
and a compelling one, why prior courts uniformly held the Act subject to
an extrastatutory nonfunctionality requirement. Although the Supreme
Court has had few opportunities to hold federal trademark legislation fatally
that are likely to cause confusion, see supra notes 125-28 (discussing fair use defense), a
plaintiff need only prove its case in chief to defeat the defense. See, e.g., Cullman
Ventures, Inc. v Columbian Art Works, Inc., 717 F Supp. 96, 134 (S.D.N.Y 1989).
253. See, e.g., Tate v. Ogg, 195 S.E. 496 (Va. 1938) (holding statute addressing "any
horse, mule, cattle, hog, sheep, or goat" inapplicable to turkeys).
254. Mobil Oil v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978).
255. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. dented, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). As previously noted, the drafters of the Lanham Act
clearly did intend to alter the common law's treatment of descriptive marks through the
enactment of §§ 14, 15, and 33. See supra note 180 (discussing legislative history of
Lanham Act). Evidence of a similar intent with respect to product configurations,
however, is wholly absent from the legislative history of these provisions. In the face of
contemporary doctrine that regarded these designs as inherently functional and therefore
incapable of registration, see supra notes 190-200 and accompanying text, it is apparent
that the Act's authors did not contemplate the registration of functional designs at all,
much less expressly intend to immunize such registrations from challenge. In the words
of the C.C.P.A.. "We think that the 1946 Act is premised on the idea that only
nonfunctional configurations may be registrable thereunder." In re Shenango Ceramics,
Inc., 362 F.2d 287, 292 (C.C.P.A. 1966); cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286 (1985) ("[J]udge[s] [should] not only consider the
language, structure, and history of the statute, but also study the values and attitudes, as
far as they can be known today, of the period when the legislation was enacted.").
256. United States v American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
257 See supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text (discussing judicially-created
exceptions to § 14).
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inconsistent with the Constitution's Patent and Copyright Clause," it has
not shirked its duty when called upon to do so. Indeed, in United States v
Steffens (7he Trademark Cases), 9 the Court invalidated the first compre-
hensive pieces of federal trademark legislation, the Trademark Acts of
18701 and 1876,261 both of which Congress had enacted under that
provision. As the Court noted of the incompatibility of these statutes with
the Constitution's grant of authority "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries" -'2
The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or
discovery The trade-mark recogmzed by the common law is generally
the growth of a considerable period of use, rather than a sudden
invention. It requires no fancy or imagination, no gemus, no
laborious thought. It is simply founded on priority of appropriation. 2
Shakespeare represents a similar constitutional violation, not because
its holding fails to protect "invention or discovery," but instead because it
purports to protect exclusive rights to inventions and discoveries longer than
the "limited times" permitted by the Constitution.' It is well established
that the policies served by the Patent and Copyright Clause and the federal
legislation enacted under its auspices are threefold:
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it
promotes disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to
permit the public to practice that invention once the patent expires; third,
the stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas
in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public.2"
258. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
259. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
260. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
261. Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141.
262. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
263. The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). Accepting the Court's suggestion
that renewed legislation on the subject might pass constitutional muster if grounded m the
Commerce Clause instead, see id. at 96-97, Congress relied on that provision m enacting
the Trademark Act of 1881. See Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502.
264. C. Best Lock Corp. v. Schlage Lock Co., 413 F.2d 1195, 1199 (C.C.P.A. 1969)
(denying registration on ground that "[i]f a configuration is functional then everyone
has the right to use the configuration for its functional purpose, subject only to such
exclusive right for a limited time as may exist under the patent laws") (emphasis added).
265. Aronson v Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
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Just as the legislation at issue in The Trademark Cases impermissibly
conflicted with the first of these policies, so too does Shakespeare's reading
of section 14 violate the second and third. Under such an interpretation,
a would-be patentee of a functional design can capture the individual
benefits reflected m the first cited policy, but avoid the costs and concomi-
tant societal benefits associated with the others. As Justice White has
observed under analogous circumstances, "[when] the public parts with the
monopoly grant for no return, the public has been imposed upon and the
patent clause subverted."I Extending trade dress protection to purely
functional designs thus is not merely inconsistent with the patent statutes
and the federal common law of unfair competition arising under the
Lanham Act; rather, "[a] prohibition against copying under such circum-
stances would contravene the policy of the Constituton which gives the
public free access to those materials in the public domain." 7
Against this backdrop, the Fourth Circuit's reliance on Park 'N Fly and
concomitant failure to recogmze that Shakespeare could not have owned
rights to its "mark" sufficient to support an application m the first place,'
266. United States v Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 199-200 (1963) (White, J.,
concurring); cf. Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 633-
34 (3d Cir. 1992) ("To allow indefinite trademark protection of product innovations would
frustrate the purpose of the limited duration of patents to foster competition by allowing
innovations to enter the public domain after seventeen years.").
267 R.M. Smith, Inc. v Collins Ltd., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 465, 468-69 (W.D. Pa.
1983) (emphasis added) (finding configuration in question nonfunctional, but unprotectable
under Lanham Act for lack of secondary meaning).
Although the Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to address the issue in the
context of the Lanham Act, the Court's decisions overturning state restrictions on copying
of product configurations make clear that the functionality doctrine is a constitutional
mandate not subject to statutory abrogation. For example, in striking down a Florida ban
on such activity, the Court noted that an "injunction against copying of an unpatented
article, freely available to the public, impermissibly 'interferefs] with the federal policy
found m Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution of allowing free access to copy whatever
the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain.'" Bonito Boats, Inc. v
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 153 (1989) (citation omitted); accord Compco
Corp. v Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964). When coupled with the
Court's holding m Feist Publications v Rural Tel. Serv Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), that
originality is a constitutional prerequisite for copyright protection, see id. at 345, statements
such as those in Bonito Boats leave little doubt that, in intellectual property cases, "the
Court has signaled its intentions to employ the Constitution to curtail the worst inclinations
in a rapidly expanding field." David Lange, Copyright and the Constitution in the Age of
Intellectual Properly, 1 J. INTELL. PROP L. 119, 133 (1993).
268. Perhaps significantly, this is the position taken by the PTO's Examining Division
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thereby rendering its registration void ab nitio,269 is even more msplaced.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts m Park 'N Fly analyzed the
relationshup between the Lanham Act and the Patent and Copyright Clause
for the sumple reason that such an analysis was not required.' Rather than
during the application process:
If the examining attorney determines that a configuration is de jure
functional, registration should be refused on the ground that the matter presented
for registration does not function as a trademark because it does not fit within
the statutory definition of a trademark under §§ 1, 2 and 45 of the Trademark
Act.
T.M.E.P., supra note 114, § 1202.03(a)(ii), at 1202-5. Thus, as the dissent in Shakespeare
correctly noted, "[w]hile the majority treats this case as if it involved solely the cancellation
of a trademark registration, such an analysis overlooks the antecedent issue of whether
an enforceable trademark exists." Shakespeare, 9 F.3d at 1099 (Niemeyer, I., dissenting).
269. "Registrations which are void ab initio should be canceled without regard to the
rights of the parties to the cancellation proceedings " Coahoma Chem. Co. v Smith,
113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 413, 420 (Conm'r Pat. 1957), aft'd, 264 F.2d 916 (C.C.P.A. 1959).
270. Indeed, Park 'N Fly's failure to address this issue arguably leaves open the
question of whether functionality is a constitutionally mandated defense to the evidentiary
presumptions attaching to an incontestable registration under §§ 15 and 33, as well as a
potential ground for cancellation. For example, in Schwmn Bicycle Co. v Murray Ohio
Mfg. Co., 339 F Supp. 973 (M.D. Tenn. 1971), aff'd, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam), the plaintiff federal registrant sought to protect the trade dress of its "knurled"
bicycle wheel runs, which were designed to obscure unsightly welded seams. The district
court, however, entered judgment for the defendant on two apparently separate grounds.
Consistent with the Ninth Circuit's holding in Park N Fly, see supra note 118 and
accompanying text (stating Ninth Circuit's holding in Park WN Fly), the Schwinn district
court held that "the registrant may not rely upon the incontestability provision as an
'offensive' weapon in a trademark infringement action." Schwinn, 339 F Supp. at 982.
Finding that the putative trade dress obviated costly and time-consuming grinding and
polishing, however, the district court also held that the defendant had introduced sufficient
evidence of functionality to rebut the presumption of validity accompanying the plaintiff's
registration under § 15. Id. at 981-82. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding
"ample evidence" that the defendant had rebutted the (supposedly "conclusive") evidentiary
significance of the plaintiff's incontestable registration. Schwinn, 470 F.2d at 977
Park 'N Fly's holding that "the holder of a registered mark may rely on incontest-
ability to enjoin infringement and that such an action may not be defended on the grounds
that the mark is merely descriptive," Park 'N Fly, Inc. v Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469
U.S. 189, 205 (1985), obviously overturns the first of the district court's grounds in
Schwmn. Whether by omission or design, however, the Park 'N Fly Court did not address
the issue of whether the Patent and Copyright Clause preserves functionality (as opposed to
descriptiveness) as a defense to §§ 15 and 33. Moreover, despite targeting the Ninth Circuit
for criticism, see id. at 196, the Court neither leveled similar wrath at the Sixth Circuit nor
identified Schwinn as part of the "direct conflict" between the circuits existing prior to the
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a utilitarian and potentially patentable article, the designation in that case
was a string of written words-a subject matter that, even if falling within
the ambit of federal copyright law,"' still would be eligible for trademark
protection.2' Equally to the point, even had the Park 'N Fly courts
undertaken such an analysis, they would not have encountered a constitu-
tional provision restricting protection of descriptive word marks to "limited
times," a restriction that is expressly contemplated with respect to useful
designs such as that in Shakespeare. Thus, to the extent that Congress may
have intended to alter the traditional incentives and disincentives associated
with the protection of product configurations in the manner contemplated
by the Fourth Circuit,' 3 such a purpose would have been constitutionally
infirm.274
decision. See id. at 193. To the extent that the Court may be charged with knowledge of
Schwmnn by virtue of the respondent's express reliance on it, see Brief of Defendant-
Respondent at 44, Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985) (No.
83-1132), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records & Briefs (Congressional Info.
Serv.), these factors suggest that the Court did not view that case as inconsistent with its
holding in Park 'W Fly. Cf. Inwood Lab., Inc. v Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 862-63
(1982) (White, J., concurring) ("It is my view that a finding of functionality offers a
complete defense to [an] infringement claim predicated solely on the reproduction of
a functional attribute of the product.").
271. As a general rule, "[c]liched language, phrases and expressions conveying an idea
that is typically expressed in a limited number of stereotypic fashions, are not subject to
copyright protection." Perma Greetings, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 598 F Supp. 445, 448
(E.D. Mo. 1984). Thus, the eligibility of the phrase "Park 'N Fly" for copyright protection
is doubtful. See Magic Mktg., Inc. v. Mailing Servs. of Pittsburgh, Inc., 634 F Supp. 769,
771-72 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
272. Although utility patent protection for functional articles and trade dress protection
for nonfunctional ones are mutually exclusive, see supra notes 247-52 and accompanying
text (comparing utility patents with trade dress protection), dual protection under the
trademark and copyright laws is not only possible, but also may be "appropriate." See
Frederick Wame & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., 481 F Supp. 1191, 1196-97 (S.D.N.Y 1979);
see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. J.A.R. Sales, Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679 (C.D.
Cal. 1982).
273. As previously noted, the evidence suggests the contrary See supra note 255
(discussing lack of evidence of congressional intent to alter common-law protection of
product configurations).
274. For an express judicial recognition of this principle subsequent to the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Shakespeare, see Kohler Co. v Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir.
1993). In Kohler, the Seventh Circuit upheld the registrability of an admittedly nonfunction-
al faucet design against the appellant's claims that registration under the Lanham Act would
impermissibly conflict with the Patent and Copyright Clause. This result, however, was
conditioned upon the premise that "provided that a defense of functionality is recognized,
1309
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1257 (1994)
This does not, of course, mean that the incontestability provisions of
sections 14, 15, and 33 are invalid in toto or that nonfunctional features of
product configurations are not entirely proper subjects for federal
registration under the Lanham Act.275 It does, however, suggest that the
historic interpretations of the Act and common law as encompassing
functionality as a complete defense to trade dress infringement actions are
more consistent with the nation's organic law than the result reached in
Shakespeare 6 Thus, even if the Shakespeare court correctly concluded
that functionality is not an express statutory ground for cancellation of a
registration that has passed its fifth aninversary, it incorrectly failed to
recognize that such a ground appears in more persuasive authority
V Conclusion
It may be true, as the dissent noted in Shakespeare, that "[t]he doctrine
of functionality is an extrastatutory doctrine, neither defined nor limited by
the express provisions of the Lanham Trademark Act f,277 Neverthe-
less, it is equally apparent that the Act on its face does not contemplate the
federal registration of trade dress in any form on the PTO's records.
Having tacitly upheld the extrastatutory registrability of product configura-
tions on the Principal Register, the Shakespeare court failed to recognize
the corresponding extrastatutory-and constitutionally mandated-limitations
historically applied to the registration and protection of such designs.
there is no conflict with federal patent law." Id. at 638 (emphasis added) (quoting W.T.
Rogers v Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1985)). As the court additionally
acknowledged m reaching its holding, "Congress could conceivably enact legislation
conferring perpetual patent-like monopolies that would conflict with the Patent Clause's
requirement that exclusive rights to authors and inventors be only 'for limited [tlimes.'" Id.
at 642-43 (citation omitted). By eviscerating the availability of the functionality defense
upon which Kohler turned, Shakespeare renders the Lanham Act just such a piece of
legislation.
275. Cf. Inwood Lab., Inc. v Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 864 n.6 (1982) (White,
J., concurring) ("This is not to suggest that the copying of a functional feature protects
a defendant who has also reproduced nonfunctional features.").
276. See American Communications Ass'n v Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 407 (1955) ("[lit
is the duty of this Court to construe a statute so as to avoid the danger of unconstitu-
tionality if it may be done in consonance with the legislative purpose."); see also United
States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1948); United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213
U.S. 366, 407-08 (1909).
277 Shakespeare, 9 F.3d at 1099 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
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If left unchallenged,278 the outcome of the Shakespeare litigants' battle
over the UGLY STIK design is likely to be a rule of law that lives up to the
name of its subject matter. The Fourth Circuit's determination that the
principles of sections 15 and 33 given effect by Park 'N Fly are equally
applicable to the product configuration context under section 14 potentially
allows federal registrants to escape the temporal limits defined by the
federal patent laws and expressly mandated by the Constitution. In
allowing functional configurations to remain in place on the Principal
Register, Shakespeare affords their owners nationwide constructive notice
of their clamis of ownership," 9 as well as the remedies afforded by the
Lanham Act in trade dress infringement suits.' At the same time,
Shakespeare removes significant incentives for designers to apply for
protection under the federal patent laws, thereby threatening to obviate
those provisions. The result is a blunt and highly visible weapon neither
contemplated by the Constitution nor compatible with the nation's carefully
crafted balance of federal intellectual property protection.
278. Although this Article has suggested that no such revision is necessary, one possible
mechanism for resolving the conflict between the Lanham Act and the Constitution created
by the Fourth Circuit's decision would be to amend § 14(3) expressly to recognize
functionality as a ground for cancellation "at any time." Pursuant to such an amendment,
for example, the revised statute might read as follows (proposed addition is emphasized):
A petition to cancel a registration of a mark, stating the grounds relied upon,
may, upon payment of the prescribed fee, be filed as follows by any person who
believes that he is or will be damaged by the registration of a mark on the
principal register
(3) At any time if the registered mark becomes the generic name for the goods
or services, or a portion thereof, for which it was registered, or has been
abandoned, or its registration was obtained fraudulently or contrary to the
provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of section [2] for a registration
under this [Act], or contrary to similar prohibitory provisions of such prior Acts
for a registration under such Acts, f the registered mark is affunctional response
to problems of usage, or if the registered mark is being used by, or with the
permission of, the registrant so as to misrepresent the source of the goods or
services on or m connection with which the mark is used.
Corresponding amendments to §§ 15 and 33 might also be appropriate to provide a defense
to the evidentiary presumptions attaching to federal registrations.
279. See 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1988).
280. See generally id. §§ 1116-1124 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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